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INTRODUCTION 
 
The right of peoples to self-determination has developed from an ambiguous political 
principle into a firm right in international law throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. As of 
today, the right is codified in a number of international treaties and conventions and has evolved 
into a rule of customary international law.1 Yet, self-determination remains one of the most 
controversial norms of international law.2 The controversy has been reflected in the arbitrary 
interpretation and the voluntary use of the right by various actors. For example, among many 
others, such actors were the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the past and its 
successor, the Russian Federation (RF) nowadays. To illustrate, when in light of the 
decolonisation processes the discussions on the right of peoples to self-determination began in 
the United Nations (UN), the USSR insisted on the freedom of the former (Western) European 
colonies but prioritised the concept of state sovereignty and territorial integrity for itself, 
maintaining that self-determination had already been articulated within the USSR.3 Eventually, 
the Soviets were able to promote self-determination so that it was included in two major UN 
treaties: the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)4 and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).5 The clause on self-
determination in these major human rights documents was interpreted in the context of 
decolonisation and the so-called Salt Water thesis, which favoured the Soviets greatly.6 Hence, 
the Soviets used different standards domestically and internationally, refusing to acknowledge 
the existence of similar issues within their territories.  
As for contemporary Russia, the contradictions and inconsistencies related to the 
understanding and the application of the right of peoples to self-determination have once again 
reappeared this time in the case of Crimea. To be specific, while Russia has been consistent in 
supporting the territorial integrity of states for years, in 2014 it changed its attitude by trying to 
justify Crimea’s annexation and incorporation into Russia based on the right of peoples to self-
determination.7 This was followed by extensive legal discussions that predominantly pinpointed 
the illegality of Russia’s actions in Crimea and the lack of legal basis for Crimea’s secession 
 
1 M. Sterio. The Right to Self-determination Under International Law: “selfistans”, Secession and the Rule of the 
Great Powers. London and New York: Routledge 2013, p. 9.  
2 J. Klabbers. The Right to Be Taken Seriously: Self-Determination in International Law. – 28 Human Rights 
Quarterly, 2006(1), p. 186.  
3 L. Mälksoo. The Soviet Approach to the Right of Peoples to Self-determination: Russia’s Farewell to jus 
publicum europaeum. – 19 The Journal of the History of International Law 2017, p. 17.  
4 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. New York 13.12.1966, e.i.f. 03.01.1979. 
5 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. New York 16.12.1966, e.i.f.  23.03.1976. 
6 Mälksoo 2017, op.cit., p. 17. 
7 T. Christakis. Self-determination, territorial integrity and fait accompli in the case of Crimea. –75 
ZaöRV/Heidelberg JIL 2015(1), p. 1.  
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based on the international legal norms on self-determination. Nevertheless, there was little or 
no attempt to examine the change of Russia’s approach to the right of peoples to self-
determination in light of the Soviet approach. In other words, in this context, most discussions 
missed the analysis of issues related to Russia’s international legal thinking, which is deeply 
rooted in the Soviet past. Hence, this study intends to fill this gap by focusing on the analysis 
of Russia’s current approach to the right of peoples to self-determination in light of the Soviet 
approach. This research presupposes a link between the Soviet and Russian approaches to self-
determination based on the legal ties between post-1991 Russia and the Soviet Union, 
established on the doctrine of state succession or even continuity. The legal ties between these 
two entities also entail links on the subject of self-determination since Russia retained “(…) the 
Soviet Federal Formula and, with it the Soviet understanding of self-determination.”8 
To continue, this study focuses on two decisive moments of the development of the right 
of peoples to self-determination in Russia: the Soviet approach to the right of peoples to self-
determination in the decolonisation period as manifested in the 1966 UN Covenants and 
Russia’s approach to the right following the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Hence, the research 
problem lies at the contradiction found in Russia’s contemporary approach to the right of 
peoples to self-determination as manifested in the case of Crimea and the way it might be related 
to the Soviet approach to self-determination in the decolonisation period. The Crimea case, 
among other things, marks the departure of Russia from her pre-Crimea approach to the right 
of peoples to self-determination, which was characterised by consistent and continuous support 
of the principle of territorial integrity of states. With this contradiction, Russia, just like the 
Soviet Union in 1966, challenged the universality of the right of peoples to self-determination. 
Given what was discussed above, the objective of the research is to look at the theory 
and practice of the right of peoples to self-determination in Russia from a historical-legal 
perspective to trace the roots of the contradictions found in Russia’s current approach there. In 
particular, the analysis aims at understanding the specifics of the Soviet approach to self-
determination and discusses the case of Crimea in light of the analogies between the past and 
present approaches to the right. Moreover, relying on the Crimea case, the thesis aims at 
establishing what exactly Russia meant by saying that they supported the right of the peoples of 
Crimea to self-determination. The study primarily focuses on the official narratives presented by 
state officials. Nevertheless, while the issue of the use of force is also central to the Crimea case, 
the given study focuses solely on the issues of self-determination and secession. In other words, 
 
8 T. Lundstedt. The Changing Nature of the Contemporary Russian Interpretation of the Right to Self-
Determination under International Law. – P. S. Morris(ed.). Russian Discourses on International Law. Routledge 
2018, p. 197. 
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the in-depth analysis of the issue of the use of force by Russia in Crimea is beyond the scope 
of this study and is only done to supplement the discussions on self-determination.  
 The study hypothesises that the current Russian approach to the right of peoples to self-
determination resembles the Soviet approach in its legal flexibility characterised by self-
interest, hypocrisy, and double-standards. To verify the hypothesis systematically, the research 
puts forward two interconnected research questions:  
• What are the characteristics of the Soviet approach to self-
determination in the 1960s and that of Russian following the 
annexation of Crimea? 
• What are the links between the Soviet approach to self-
determination in 1966 and that of Russia following the annexation 
of Crimea, if any?  
 The thesis argues that while all major countries are somewhat hypocritical, however, in 
the discussed situations, the USSR and Russia respectively have been less consistent and more 
hypocritical than the Western powers. Nevertheless, the study does not pretend or attempt to 
establish any measurable causal links between the past and present factors but rather argues that 
history should not be undervalued while discussing the Russian approaches to the right of 
peoples to self-determination in particular. The value of historical perspective in the analysis of 
the Russian approaches to international law has been emphasised and justified by different 
scholars. As Isaeva argues, it is vital “(…) to reconstruct the bonds between the past and present 
to grasp the essence of the subject.”9 Specifically, she contends that “the role of the Soviet 
heritage should not be neglected during any meaningful and complex study of the peculiarities 
of Russian understanding and the use of law.”10 Hence, this study is vital, given the scarcity of 
attention paid to the analogies between the Soviet and Russian approaches to the right. Another 
important question that needs to be addressed in advance is whether such a study will not 
contribute to the fragmentation of international law. The answer is that “the universality of 
international law is still contested.”11 Hence, each state deserves and needs to be discussed 
separately. This is especially true for Russia, given its complex history. 
 The research is topical as Russia is still involved in different regional secessionist 
conflicts where self-determination is used as a key argument for separation, including 
 
9 A. Isaeva. Contradictions and Incompleteness in Russian Legal Discources, – P. S. Morris(ed.). Russian 
Discources on International Law. New York and London: Routledge 2019, p. 44. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
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Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Nagorno-Karabakh.12 For example, Russia has 
ambiguously styled herself as a mediator for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and understanding 
Russia’s approach to the right to self-determination may help to comprehend and predict the 
dynamics of the peace talks. Thus, the theoretical and practical importance of the thesis is 
apparent. Besides, the research is relevant in light of the revived interest in secessionist 
movements. What is more, the study contributes to the continuing discussions on the 
development of the right of peoples to self-determination. Most importantly, the research brings 
a fresh approach to the discussions of the Crimea case from a new legal-historical perspective. 
 To demonstrate the novelty and the relevance of the study, it is important to highlight 
what has already been said regarding the subject in the academic literature and point out the 
gaps that this study intends to fill in. The examination of self-determination in international law 
has preoccupied the interest of legal scholars for a long time. To name a few, Casesse analyses 
the legal complexities evolved around the right to self-determination in international law at each 
period of its development.13 Similarly, Sterio provides a thorough account of the evolution of 
self-determination in international law, starting with the Wilsonian idea of self-determination 
and ending with the analysis of the most famous legal cases regarding the subject.14 Moreover, 
Castellino focuses on the clash between self-determination and territorial integrity, and 
Hannum raises serious questions regarding the state of self-determination in the postcolonial 
period.15 Meanwhile, while  Nanda and  Vidmar explore the complexities of secession in 
international law, Buchanan offers a perspective on the remedial secession theory.16  
 Nevertheless, there are very few studies focusing on the right of peoples to self-
determination more narrowly in the context of the Soviet and Russian legal thinking. For 
instance, Mälksoo examines the Soviet approaches to the right, exploring the ways it differed 
from the Western liberal approach.17 However, the article focuses on the Soviet approach 
primarily, leaving out the analysis of modern Russian thinking and practices. Meanwhile, the 
author looks at this issue in another publication, where specific attention is paid to the 
discussion on self-determination by the Russian legal scholarship.18 Furthermore, another work, 
 
12 C. J. Borgen. Law, rhetoric, strategy: Russia and self-determination before and after Crimea. – 91 International 
law studies 2015(1), p. 266. 
13 A. Cassese. Self-determination of peoples: a legal reappraisal. Cambridge University Press 1995, p. 279. 
14 Sterio, op. cit., p. 9. 
15 J. Castellino.Territorial integrity and the right to self-determination: an examination of the conceptual tools. –
33 Brook. J. Int'l L. 2008, p.  513; H. Hannum. Rethinking self-determination. – 34 Virginia Journal of 
International Law 1993(1), p. 11. 
16 V. P. Nanda. Self-Determination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to Secede. – 13 Case W. Res. J. 
Int'l L., 1981(2); J. Vidmar. Remedial Secession in International Law: Theory and (Lack of) Practice. –  6 St 
Antony's International Review 2010(1); A. Buchanan. Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral 
Foundations for International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004.  
17 Mälksoo 2017, op. cit. 
18 L.  Mälksoo. Russian approaches to international law. USA: Oxford University Press 2015, p. 12. 
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which is central to this study, is a recent contribution to a monograph by Lundstedt, published 
in 2019.19 This work traces the changes and the continuities in contemporary Russian legal 
thinking regarding the right of peoples to self-determination, taking into consideration the 
Soviet interpretation of the right. Nevertheless, here the author provides a very broad and 
general analysis. As for the analysis of the Crimea case, two works are worth mentioning. First,  
the analysis by Borgen, which examines the use of international legal arguments concerning 
self-determination in Ukraine by Russia as a part of its foreign policy strategies.20 Second, the 
work of Rotaru and Troncotă, which focuses on the instrumentalisation of the Kosovo argument 
in the Crimea case in light of Russia’s foreign policy goals.21  
 Overall, while there is extensive literature on the right of peoples to self-determination 
and some attention is also paid to the Russian approaches to the right, these studies focus either 
on different aspects of the issue or draw attention to specific periods or have completely 
different research questions or methodology. In contradiction, the given thesis brings freshness 
and novelty with the help of a different hypothesis, research questions, and a clearly defined 
methodological approach. The current study discusses international law, not with the classical 
methods of international legal research. It rather utilises a legal-historical method to connect 
the dots between the past and present, a comparative method to understand the differences 
between the Soviet and Western approaches and to draw links between the Soviet and current 
Russian approaches to self-determination and Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA) for the 
systematic analysis of Russia’s justification narratives of the annexation of Crimea. To carry 
out the QCA analysis the study uses the leading MAXQDA software for qualitative data 
analysis. It looks at fifty-one official documents comprised of both primary and secondary 
sources mainly published on the official website of the MFA of the RF. The analysis reflects 
the most relevant speeches and interviews of Russia’s high-ranking officials on the justification 
of Crimea’s annexation from the 2014-2020 period. Regarding this, the strength of the study is 
the author’s knowledge of the Russian language, which allows interacting with primary sources 
in their original language. Overall, this study systematises, improves and refines the discussions 
on the Russian approaches to the right of peoples to self-determination. 
 To continue, the thesis adheres to the following structure. The first chapter looks at the 
development of self-determination in international law in 3 main periods: 1) Wilsonian, 2) 
decolonisation, 3) post-colonial, with a focus on the development of the right of self-
determination in treaty law. Furthermore, it discusses the controversies evolved around the issue 
 
19 Lundstedt, op. cit. 
20 Borgen. 2015, op. cit. 
21 V. Rotaru  & M. Troncotă. Continuity and change in instrumentalizing ‘The Precedent’. How Russia uses 
Kosovo to legitimize the annexation of Crimea. – 17 Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 2017(3). 
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of the interpretation of the “self” in self-determination by looking at treaties, opinio juris and 
the works of renowned scholars of international law. Moreover, it looks at the interaction of 
self-determination and secession, with a specific focus on remedial secession theory. To 
complete the picture, the final part of the first chapter discusses several important cases found 
in international jurisprudence on the subject, with a specific focus on the practice of the ICJ. 
Furthermore, the second chapter examines the specifics of the Soviet approach to the right of 
peoples to self-determination. First, it examines the aspects of Lenin’s understanding of the 
right to delineate the foundational differences with the Wilsonian, liberal-democratic idea of 
self-determination. This is followed by an analysis of the theoretical and practical implications 
of the Soviet Peace treaties of 1920 and culminates in a discussion with the Soviet approach to 
the right of peoples to self-determination in the 1966 UN documents. The final chapter deals 
with Russia’s current approach to the right of peoples to self-determination with a special focus 
on the Crimea case. It starts the discussion by establishing the links between the legal thinking 
of Soviet Union and contemporary Russia simultaneously analysing the influence of the Soviet 
ideology on modern Russian thinking. Furthermore, it discusses the key foreign policy factors 
influencing Russia’s approach to self-determination, then continues with establishing Russia’s 
approach to self-determination in the 1991- 2014 period. The final part focuses on the analysis 
of the Crimea case and the change of the narrative following the annexation of Crimea in 2014. 
It at the same time attempts to connect the dots between the Soviet and Russian thinking on 
self-determination. The conclusion discusses the main findings in light of the hypothesis and 
the research questions posed in the introduction. 
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1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT OF PEOPLES TO SELF-
DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
1.1. The Evolution of Self-determination in International Law 
 
1.1.1. The Wilsonian Period 
 
 Self-determination has traditionally been deemed to be “inextricable from 
democracy.”22 The forefathers of the liberal-democratic idea of self-determination are figures 
such as “Mill and Mazzini, Wilson and Russeau.”23 While the Bolsheviks have also contributed 
to the development of the concept, Lenin’s idea of self-determination was different from the 
liberal-democratic one as it was “based on violent secession to liberate people from bourgeois 
governments.”24 Even though the notion of self-determination was not novel to the 
philosophical circles in the period preceding the 20th century, it found its unique place in 
international law amidst the developments following the WWI. Subsequently, the evolution of 
self-determination from a vague principle into a firm right in international law is traced 
throughout the 20th century in 3 main phases: 1) Wilsonian, 2) decolonisation, 3) post-
colonial.25 Each evolutionary stage is signified with its specific issues and controversies 
concerning the meaning and the application of self-determination coupled with the adoption of 
new terminology and changing definitions. 26  
 The Wilsonian phase signals the entry of self-determination into the realm of 
international law as it gained global acknowledgment and value following the development of 
WWI. Above all, the idea of self-determination was placed well within the US President 
Woodrow Wilson’s vision for the “postwar world” order.27 In the initial stage, the Wilsonian 
self-determination entailed self-government and the right to select state authorities and political 
leaders, nevertheless, this changed in line with the development of the WWI: gradually self-
determination took external dimension. The external dimension, in its turn, entailed four 
different variations of self-determination: 1) the right of the people to choose its government, 
2) the restructuring of the states of Central Europe, 3) self-determination as a criterion 
governing territorial change; 4) the settlement of the colonial claims taking into consideration 
 
22 D. Philpott. In defense of self-determination. –105 Ethics 1995(2), pp. 352-353. 
23 Ibid., p. 355. 
24 Sterio,op. cit., p. 9. 
25 Hannum, op. cit., p. 66. 
26 Ibid. 
27 E. Manela. The Wilsonian moment: self-determination and the international origins of anticolonial nationalism. 
Oxford University Press 2007, p. 21. 
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the interests of the colonial powers.28 Eventually, the Wilsonian concept of self-determination 
became a guiding principle during the negotiations of great powers on the future of the 
collapsed Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires.29 In this paradigm, self-determination was 
envisaged in the context of a situation “(…) where a large empire ceases to exist and new states 
inhabited by distinct peoples are created.”30 Notwithstanding, as history illustrated, the 
Wilsonian idea of self-determination remained a political concept and apart from the promise 
of promoting democracy and satisfying senses of national aspirations, it did not recognise the 
right of all peoples to govern their life free from external domination.”31 
 The Wilsonian idea of self-determination has been subjected to criticism primarily due 
to its vague formulation as “no one knew exactly what it meant.”32 As Wilson's secretary of 
state Lansing famously warned, self-determination was “loaded with dynamite”33 and Wilson 
himself was not aware of the possible implications of his theory.34 Serious concerns were raised 
that it may escape the entailed context of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires and feed 
independence movements elsewhere.35 Moreover, the Wilsonian idea of self-determination did 
not entail universality.36 To illustrate, the fact that the great powers failed to meaningfully apply 
the concept of self-determination outside of European situations reveals that it was applied to 
Europeans only. Still, Wilson did not exclude the colonial peoples from the paradigm of self-
determination, instead, he envisaged it as a gradual process of achieving self-government 
supervised by the so-called civilised power as reflected in Wilson’s attempts to establish the 
League of Nations “mandates” over the colonial territories. Nevertheless, during the Paris Peace 
Conference, Wilson’s main focus remained on the issues of European situations.37  
 Another criticism pinpointing the hypocrisy of the Wilsonian idea of self-determination 
is directed to Wilson’s attitude “towards the United States’ imperial possessions and his views 
on race relations.”38 Having never challenged his racial assumptions, he disapproved of social 
mixing between different races.39 Most importantly, Wilson rejected the application of internal 
 
28 Cassese, op. cit., pp. 19-21.  
29 Sterio, op. cit.,, p. 10. 
30 Ibid., p. 27. 
31 Hannum, op. cit., p. 68. 
32 L. M. Graham. Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples After Kosovo: Translating Self-Determination 'Into 
Practice' and 'Into Peace'. – 6 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law 2000(2), p. 456. 
33 Klabbers, op. cit., p. 187. 
34 Cassese, op. cit., pp. 19-21.  
35 Graham, op. cit., p. 456. 
36 Hannum, op. cit., p. 22. 
37 Manela, op. cit., p. 25. 
38 Ibid., p. 26. 
39 Manela, op. cit., p. 26. 
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self-determination to the United States.40 Thus, the Wilsonian idea of self-determination was 
far from being universal.  
 Given what was discussed above, it is not surprising that the clause promising the 
application of self-determination was left out of the final draft of the Covenant of the League 
of Nations. In contrast, the right of the existing states to territorial integrity found its firm place 
in the document. The ideas suggested in the Versailles did not culminate in the development of 
a general norm of international law.41 Nonetheless, the essentially political concept of self-
determination became an important basis for fortifying political commitments to anticolonial 
agendas, not necessarily the way that Wilson had envisioned.42 Nevertheless, the post-WWII 
era marked the development of self-determination into a clear right in international law, 
reflecting the struggles of colonial and marginalised peoples.  
 
1.1.2. The Decolonisation Period  
 
 While the Wilsonian idea of self-determination was idealistic and political at its core 
and failed to become a legal instrument offering a clear solution to the issues of different groups 
of peoples in the post-WWI period, it still greatly inspired and redefined the struggles of these 
peoples for their political future in the subsequent periods. This was reflected in the post-WWII 
phase when self-determination eventually acquired the status of a legal right. Even though the 
UN was not willing to recognise self-determination as a fundamental right in its initial stage of 
activity, given the analogy with “Hitler's attempts to reunify the German “nation,”43 self-
determination eventually found its place in the UN Charter. The Charter mentions self-
determination twice, in the context of developing friendly relations among nations and the 
principle of equal rights.44 Apart from stating that member states should allow the self-
government of minorities within the range of their possibility, the Charter did not elaborate on 
various forms of self-determination, i.e. internal and external, and did not pose any legal 
obligation on member states. In other words, it still failed to provide a comprehensive definition 
of the right.  Nonetheless, it is well-understood that the UN Charter did not foresee any right to 
external self-determination for minority groups and colonised peoples. However, the inclusion 
of self-determination in such an important multilateral treaty is essential in codifying the 
progress of self-determination from a political principle into a “legal standard of behavior.”45  
 
40 Ibid. 
41 Sterio, op. cit., p. 10.  
42 Manela, op. cit., p. 222. 
43 Hannum, op. cit., p. 11. 
44 Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco on 26. 06.1945, e.i.f. 24.10.1945, Art 1., para. 2. 
45 Sterio, op. cit., p. 9. 
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 The transformation of self-determination continued during the decolonisation period, 
when political developments in the UN, starting in the 1960s, became the pretext for the 
evolution of the right in question. In this phase, self-determination was utilised in the context 
of granting the colonised peoples the right to freely decide their political fate.46 This was first 
captured in two UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions: the Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples adopted by GA resolution 1514,47 and 
Resolution 1541,48 which contained an annex specifying the modalities of self-determination 
for colonised peoples. According to the Article 2 of the resolution 1514: “all peoples have the 
right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and 
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”49 Nevertheless, the 1960 
declaration was accompanied by ad hoc restrictions: the so so-called Salt Water thesis stipulated 
that self-determination could be invoked only by those territories that were geographically 
separate from the colonising power or the ones divided by blue water.50 Hence, the Salt Water 
thesis in itself involves double-standards that accompanied the process of the decolonisation in 
the UN. Be it as it may, the legal reading of the 1960 Declaration ought to be carried out in its 
historical context, having in mind the nature and the intent of the Declaration, the particular 
issues it dealt with and the timing thereof.51 Hence, the Declaration provided for the possibility 
of the right to external self-determination only for colonies.  
 While the UNGA resolutions indicated the development of self-determination in the 
colonial context reflecting the political consensus amongst the UN member states on the issue 
of colonialism, they did not pose any obligations on member states. This changed in 1966 when 
self-determination was championed in two major UN treaties:  ICESCR and ICCPR.52 These 
documents marked a critical point for the advancement of self-determination into a commonly 
accepted right in international law.53 The language of the Covenants, which delineates the 
contemporary understanding of the right of self-determination in a legally binding manner, is 
the most definitive one currently existing.54 According to common Article 1 of the Covenants: 
 
46 Ibid., p. 10.  
47 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, UN General Assembly 
A/RES/1514(XV), adopted 14.12.1960, Art. 2.  
48 Principles which should guide Members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the 
information called for under Article 73e of the Charter, UN General Assembly A/RES/1541, adopted 15.12.1960.  
49 Ibid. 
50 J. Corntassel. Toward Sustainable Self-determination: Rethinking the Contemporary Indigenous-rights 
Discourse. – 33 Alternatives 2008(1), p. 108. 
51 Nanda, op. cit., p. 257. 
52 ICCPR, op. cit.; ICESCR, op. cit. 
53 C. J. Borgen. The language of law and the practice of politics: great powers and the rhetoric of self-determination 
in the cases of Kosovo and South Ossetia. – 10 Chi. J. Int'l L. 2009 (1), p. 7. 
54 Nanda, op. cit., p. 18. 
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“all peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development (…) The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those 
having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust 
Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall 
respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United 
Nations.”55 
 The Covenants granted a new meaning to the right to self-determination. Specifically, 
while obliging member states to respect a people’s right to some form of democratic self-
governance, the Covenants clarified the format of self-determination for colonised and non-
colonised peoples. In particular, non-colonised peoples were entitled to a form of internal 
governance within their mother state, however, they did not acquire the right to seek 
independence. As for the colonised peoples, they were granted the right to freely decide their 
international status and to determine their political fate. The Covenants entailed three possible 
outcomes for colonised peoples: 1) forming an independent state, 2) remaining a part of their 
coloniser, 3) association with another state. In contrast, non-colonised peoples could not rely 
on the Covenants to exercise their right to self-determination and to seek a legal separation from 
their coloniser through remedial secession.56 
 All in all, towards the end of the decolonisation movement in the early 1970s in 
international law, colonised people obtained the right to self-determination and were 
subsequently entailed to decide their political future. What is more, the right belonged to a 
people as a whole, in a territorial sense and no referendum was entailed for this. Most 
importantly once a colonised people exercised its right to external self-determination, meaning 
decided on the possible outcome, that right expired. As for non-colonised peoples, they could 
rely on this right to argue for the establishment of autonomy or regional political governance 
but had no right to seek independence from their mother states based on self-determination.57 
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1.1.3. The Postcolonial Period 
 
 
 While it is considered that at the end of the decolonisation period the issue of self-
determination was clarified and resolved once and for all, in reality, some discussions continued 
to evolve even after the 1970s. The most important questions at the time were whether self-
determination had any significance in the postcolonial context.58 If the answer was yes, then 
the next question was, who was qualified to claim a right to self-determination.59 The 
development of the right of people to self-determination in the postcolonial period has been 
captured by UNGA declarations and other political documents. One such document is the 
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States (FRD), which reflects the promotion of self-determination as a human right.60 It 
the context of the previous articles, FRD inter alia criticises the use of force directed against 
the actualisation of the right to self-determination.61 Nevertheless, it also prioritises the 
principle of territorial integrity of states over the right of self-determination.62  
 Meanwhile, some interesting discussions developed from the interpretations of the 
safeguard clause of the FRD, which reinstates that the text of the declaration should not 
encourage actions against the territorial integrity and sovereignty of those states “(…) 
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination 
of peoples (…).”63 The inverted reading of the safeguard clause gave rise to the remedial 
secession theory, which is discussed thoroughly in the following parts of the research.64 To 
replicate the discussion briefly, the proponents of the so-called remedial secession theory 
assume the possibility of secession for a group of people in exceptional circumstances in case 
several grievances are present. Nevertheless, the theoretical and practical foundations for such 
a theory are very weak.65 Notwithstanding the shortcomings of the remedial secession theory, 
its emergence in itself reflects the ongoing debates around self-determination in international 
law. International law is expected to come up with a more comprehensive and fresh approach 
to self-determination addressing the needs of the postcolonial period.  
 The fact that self-determination still mattered in the postcolonial world societies was 
later reflected by the inclusion of a provision on self-determination in the Helsinki Final Act in 
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1975.66 While a political document, it still matters as it represents the understanding between 
the Western and Soviet blocks on several issues, including self-determination.67 Given that the 
era of colonialism was ended in Europe by the time of the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act, 
the need to include a provision on self-determination in this document was inspired by non-
colonial realities, such as the question of divided Germany, Northern Ireland, Quebec in line 
with the issues of different groups of minorities living in the authoritarian European States, etc. 
These issues illustrated that the UN texts did not properly address the issues of self-
determination of these groups. Hence, a provision on self-determination was included in the 
Helsinki Final Act by the proposal of the Federal Republic of Germany.68 In the end, the final 
text reflected the modern-day view of these states on self-determination, which, inter alia, states 
that “(…) by virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples 
always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and 
external political status (…).”69 
 The Helsinki language is seen as expansive, nevertheless, it does not infer an external 
right to self-determination to national minorities and must be read in the context of the 
principles of the inviolability of frontiers and the territorial integrity of states, which are clearly 
stated in the document.70 Meanwhile, the Helsinki Declaration is indicative of a new trend 
towards wider recognition of self-determination.71 This view was later confirmed in the 1990 
Paris Charter, which is also a political document.72 Finally, the reluctance to accept secession 
outside the decolonisation context has also been reflected in the discussions on the right of 
indigenous peoples to self-determination, which eventually resulted in the adoption of the 2007 
UNGA Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.73 While Article 3 entails the self-
determination of indigenous people, however, the limitation to internal autonomy or self-
government is entailed in Article 4.74 What is more, four major Western countries such as 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States voted against the resolution. While this 
is not a binding instrument, it still indicated that these countries explicitly and without hypocrisy 
stated their position towards the issue, meanwhile, Russia abstained.75  
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Overall, in the post-colonial era self-determination is more about granting people the 
right to govern themselves based on the norms of democracy. Here, the notion of internal self-
determination is intertwined with human rights norms, in particular the rights of minorities and 
indigenous peoples.76 In other words, self-determination in the postcolonial period is 
understood as a procedural right that may not amount to a right to internal or external self-
determination.77 Nevertheless, scholars continue discussing issues such as the modalities 
between moral and legal norms on self-determination,78 the tension between identity-based and 
territory-based self-determination,79 and the issues of indigenous self-determination,80  
continuing to actualise the need for a new framework for self-determination. 
 To conclude, the discussion on the evolution of self-determination in international law 
indicated that initially, self-determination was a vague political principle. Nevertheless, while 
it did not constitute a legal tool for addressing the issues of different groups of peoples following 
the WWI, it did genuinely inspire and affect the struggles of those peoples in the following 
periods. Eventually, in the UN era self-determination acquired a status of a legal right by being 
incorporated first in the UN Charter and later in some other UNGA resolutions and finally, in 
the 1966 human rights Covenants. Most importantly self-determination at this stage was 
formulated in the context of decolonisation. In other words, it is the colonial people that were 
granted the possibility to decide their political future externally. As for other groups, self-
determination was foreseen only internally. Moreover, the discussion indicated that while the 
decolonisation was considered to be complete at the end of the 1970s, the discussions on self-
determination continued as many issues remained unresolved. Specifically, these discussions 
indicated that while territorial integrity of states was prioritised at this stage, still, some scholars 
considered the importance of the discussions on secession in exceptional circumstances as a 
remedy of last resort. Nonetheless, this is a marginalised approach as self-determination in the 
postcolonial period is understood to be a procedural right, which does not involve the right to 
external self-determination.  
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1.2. Self-determination and Remedial Secession 
 
 The discussion on the evolution of the right of self-determination indicated that at each 
phase of its development it has been in a constant clash with the principle of territorial integrity 
of states, which has traditionally been prioritised over the principle of self-determination.81 
Territorial integrity lies at the core of the contemporary international legal system and is based 
on the doctrines of uti possidetis juris and terra nullius. Both terra nullius and uti possidetis 
juris became prominent in international law in the context of “the European expansion into the 
Americas.”82 Initially terra nullius referred to empty territories that were free for colonisation, 
however, unlike uti possidetis juris, it has limited contemporary significance as it gradually 
took “racist overtones.”83 As for uti posseditis juris, it protects the shareholders’ rights to the 
land and has been used in the practice of ICJ and other judicial bodies in cases concerning 
territoriality.84 The best example of the use of the doctrine is in the ICJ’s opinion in Frontier 
Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Mali), where the court stated that the primary aim of the principle 
was to secure respect for the territorial boundaries while achieving independence.85 As for terra 
nullius, it is reflected in the ICJ judgment in the Western Sahara Case, where the court 
determined that Western Sahara was not terra nullius before the Spanish arrival.86  
 The clash between self-determination and territorial integrity is significant in the case 
of external self-determination, i.e. secession. In practice, the right of peoples to self-
determination can be actualised internally or in some cases externally. An example of internal 
self-determination would be the autonomy of a group of people within a central state: autonomy 
is understood as having the “rights to self-government, political autonomy, cultural, religious 
and linguistic freedoms.”87 As for external self-determination, it entails independence of the 
group and has traditionally been only applied to people under colonial domination or some kind 
of oppression.88 Secession is the most dramatic outcome of the self-determination claim as 
states traditionally disapprove it given that the encouragement of territorial separation is 
perceived to be dangerous and unacceptable by states.89 Understandably, if secession was 
granted easily, it would eventually result in chaos and anarchy.90 Hence, states have 
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demonstrated hostility towards such cases of secession by applying the regime of collective 
non-recognition.91 Be it as it may, the discussions on self-determination go hand in hand with 
discussions on secession, as both are considered to be “siamese twin(s) at birth.”92 
 While talking about secession, it must be noted that it is not a recognised right in 
international law, however, secession is not prohibited either.93 Nevertheless, secession is 
regulated by the legal provisions on self-determination and territorial integrity. One must 
distinguish constitutional or consensual secession from the unilateral act of secession. In the 
case of consensual secession, the situation is straightforward: international law does not prohibit 
it as long as it is exercised under constitutional processes.94 In contrast, non-consensual or 
unilateral secession is allowed only in the context of decolonisation and arguably in case of 
reclamation of a territory subject to unjust military occupation.95 Nonetheless, nowadays some 
additional theories discuss the possibility of secession under other circumstances. For example, 
while some scholars uphold to the territorial view of secession, submitting that “separatist 
movements cannot be understood or evaluated without reference to claims to territory,”96 the 
proponents of “choice theory”97 argue that secession is possible for any geographically defined 
group as long as it is the choice of the majority, hence entailing a larger possibility for secession. 
Besides, remedial secession presumes the possibility of secession in exceptional circumstances 
such as grave violations of human rights by the mother state.98 Nevertheless, it is the discussions 
on remedial secession theory that gained particular attention recently given its attempt to 
provide a middle ground in the postcolonial era. 
 The scholarly discussions on the remedial secession scheme revolved around the issue 
of whether the non-compliance of the mother states with the norms outlined in the safeguard 
clause of FRD gave any room for secession. Thus, the legal foundation of the remedial 
secession scheme is based on the inverted reading of the final paragraph of the FRD. The 
remedial secession scheme relies on “just cause” theory and its proponents dismiss the 
possibility of absolute right to self-determination in favour of allowing the possibility of 
secession in the presence of several condition.99 Buchanan, for example, is one of the most 
active proponents of remedial secession theory and considers that it offers the best way for 
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international law to respond to secession in modern times.100 He deems the following list of 
grievances to be sufficient for allowing non-consensual secession outside the decolonisation 
context: 1) large-scale and persistent violations of basic individual human rights, 2) the unjust 
taking of a legitimate state’s territory 3) serious and persistent violations of intrastate autonomy 
agreement.101 According to this scheme, the right to secession is actualised in two stages: 1) the 
recognition of a right of a group to overthrow the mother state’s authority in case the respective 
grievances are evident, 2) the entity should make efforts to meet the criteria of legitimate 
statehood. The two-staged approach indicates that the right to secession is understood more 
weakly. Here secession is understood as a remedy of last resort and can be considered only in 
case the other options of internal self-determination are deemed impossible.102 Nevertheless, 
the theory of remedial secession is widely subjected to criticism. For example, while the theory 
is discussed by some scholars, the academic proponents of remedial secession express their 
support cautiously without taking a firm stance on whether this right exists or not.103 Another 
counter-argument is that a theory built on an inverted reading of a clause is problematic. 
Specifically, Shaw claims that “such a major change in legal principle cannot be introduced by 
way of an ambiguous subordinate clause.”104  
 The practice of judicial bodies also does not strongly support the possibility of remedial 
secession. One of the most famous legal cases, which arguably relies on the inverted reading of 
the safeguard clause of FRD is Reference Re Secession of Quebec.105  Here, while deciding on 
the fate of Quebec the Supreme Court of Canada stated that apart from the colonial context 
secession is possible in case “(…) a people is subject to alien subjugation, domination or 
exploitation outside a colonial context.”106 Besides, in the 1997 case of Loizidou v Turkey, 
before the European Court of Human Rights, Judges Wildhaber and Ryssdal implied the 
possibility of remedial secession.107 Nonetheless, these few examples are marginalised and do 
not reflect the general view on remedial secession in jurisprudence as no judicial body has 
accepted remedial secession as an entitlement in any particular case.  
 To continue, the practical application of remedial secession is also controversial.108 The 
analysis indicates that usually, a successful secession requires the recognition of the parent 
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state, which is already a consensual secession rather than a remedial one. For example, Eritrea 
and East Timor were eventually granted independence as their parent states recognised them, 
also these entities were separate colonies previously.109 What is more, Bangladesh was 
recognised universally only once Pakistan recognised it first, thus counting as a consensual 
secession.110 Finally, when it comes to the Soviet Union, its dissolution is generally considered 
to be rather a consensual act that was supported by all republics in the first place, which entails 
that it cannot be interpreted as an example of practical application of remedial secession.111  
 All in all, while some writers actively support and promote the remedial secession 
theory, its theoretical and practical foundations remain controversial. Theoretically, it is 
questionable whether remedial secession can be founded on the inverted reading of the 
safeguard clause of the FRD. Also, while the doctrine has been discussed in some judicial 
decisions, no international judicial body has ever upheld the remedial secession argument 
concerning a specific attempt at unilateral secession.112 Moreover, there is not enough evidence 
supporting the usage of remedial secession in state practice.  
 
1.3. The Issue of the “Self” in Self-determination 
 
 One point that the UN treaties and other regional and international documents have 
remained silent about is the definition of the “self” or “people” in self-determination. At each 
period the ambiguity of the language and the vagueness of the definition of “people” was 
resolved by ad hoc practical interpretations. Nevertheless, such interpretations left room for 
opportunistic behavior.113 In addition to the UN treaties, the UN bodies also remained silent on 
the matter. In particular, the UN Committee on Human Rights (HRC) has been criticised for 
not attempting to provide any governing criteria.114 Nevertheless, in Lubicon Lake Band v 
Canada case the HRC concluded that individuals are not entitled to the right to self-
determination, meaning that “people” were to be understood as a group or collective of 
individuals. However, the HRC did not define the collective or group as such.115  
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 Meanwhile, traditionally a two-part test has been applied to determine whether or not a 
group qualifies as a “people.” The first part of the test entails the examination of the common 
traits of a group such as their racial background, ethnicity, language, religion, history, etc. The 
second part is about evaluating the way the people within the group perceive themselves as 
distinct “people.”116 Such an approach was visible during the Wilsonian time, and the issue was 
supposed to be sought out by the help of expert commissions. Nevertheless, the decisive factor 
at this stage was the dividing line, depending on which a “(…) community aspiring to 
nationhood can become either a people, entitled to full self-government, or a minority.”117 As 
for the decolonisation period, this question was secondary, given the significant degree of 
political consensus on the scope of the application of the right. In particular, at this stage, the 
general understanding was that the “self” was the colonial population and the “self” was 
subordinated to the already fixed colonial administrative boundaries. The territorial definition 
of the peoples, however, has been subjected to criticism, specifically in the case of African 
countries, where lines were drawn without considering the opinion of inhabiting people.118 
 Unsurprisingly, during the post-colonial era, the main question was whether the term 
meant more than just the populations of colonies.119  The territorial understanding of the “self” 
was dissatisfactory in light of the renewed attention towards the rights of indigenous 
populations in Canada and Australia. In the 1998 Quebec case, the Supreme Court of Canada 
held that the definition of “peoples” was not precise.120 Meanwhile, Cassese argues this is not 
a primary issue as the lack of formal definition of “peoples” does not prevent the interpreter 
from making inferences based on the context of the legal framework. Hence, depending on such 
a context, the “self” is either colonial people, people living under foreign domination, racial 
group or the whole population of each Contracting State.121  
 
1.4. The Right of Self-determination in International Jurisprudence 
 
 The scope of self-determination amidst the developments of the WWI was clarified in 
the Aaland Islands case. Following Finland’s independence in 1917, the Aalanders, who 
considered themselves ethnically Swedish, wanted to secede from Finland to reunite with 
Sweden. Finland and Sweden brought this issue before the League of Nations. The appointed 
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International Committee of Jurists inter alia reached several important conclusions regarding 
self-determination.122 First, the Committee stipulated that “positive International Law does not 
recognise the right of national groups, as such, to separate themselves from the State of which 
they form a part by the simple expression of a wish.”123 Furthermore, the Committee determined 
that under normal circumstances, issues regarding national groups living within existing states 
are matters of domestic jurisdiction.124 However, this came with exceptions, which implicitly 
entailed the possibility of international involvement to protect the human rights of a minority 
group, if those rights were abused by the mother state.125 Moreover, the Committee stated that 
under both domestic and international law, “(…) the formation, transformation, and 
dismemberment of States as a result of revolutions and wars create situations of fact which, to 
a large extent, cannot be met by the application of the normal rules of positive law.”126 Thus, if 
read invertedly, in these exceptional instances the principle of self-determination of peoples 
may become relevant.127 
 After establishing the jurisdiction of the League of Nations over the Aaland Islands 
issue, the League appointed a Commission of Rapporteurs to recommend a solution to the 
problem. The Commission concluded that the precedent of Finland could not be invoked for 
the Aaland Islands as they had not been treated the same way as Finland was treated by 
Russia.128 Moreover, the Commission refused to accept a general right to external self-
determination for minority groups, but explicitly stipulated the possibility of secession as “(…) 
a last resort when the State lacks either the will or the power to enact and apply just and effective 
guarantees.”129 Here one may see the first seeds of the notion of remedial secession.130 
 After a few decades, the issue of self-determination was discussed by the ICJ in the 
famous Namibia case. While self-determination was not the central issue of the case, it was still 
important given the continuing relevance of the case for international law.131 The ICJ affirmed 
the existence of the right to self-determination in positive international law, stating that it 
applied to Namibia, presumably suggesting that the process of decolonisation could be 
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explained in terms of the application of the right to self-determination.132 While the ideas on 
self-determination stipulated in this case are not deemed “terribly consequential,”133 they 
portrayed self-determination as a substantive right primarily in the context of decolonisation.134   
 A few years after the Namibia case the court had a chance to comment on the right to 
self-determination in its Western Sahara advisory opinion, adopting a different approach.135 
The Western Sahara case is crucial for understanding the scope of the application of self-
determination in the decolonisation period.136 To be precise, the UNGA requested an advisory 
opinion from the ICJ on Western Sahara, posing two questions before the court: “whether the 
territory of Western Sahara was at the time of colonization by Spain terra nullius, a territory 
belonging to no one, and, if the answer to the first question was in the affirmative, what legal 
ties existed between Western Sahara, Morocco, and Mauritania.”137 The ICJ determined that 
Western Sahara was not terra nullius at the time of Spain’s colonisation, remaining silent on 
the legality of Morocco’s or Mauritania’s territorial claims to Western Sahara.138 Furthermore, 
the court concluded that the people of Western Sahara had the right to self-determination, which 
had not been affected by any territorial claims to this region by Morocco or Mauritania.139   
 The inability of the court to provide a more decisive framework on self-determination 
vs. territorial integrity claims was seen as a significant drawback in the activity of the court.140 
It has been criticised by several judges issuing concurring and/or dissenting opinions. While 
the judges agreed with the premise that the people of Western Sahara possessed the legal right 
to self-determination, they pushed for more precise legal reasoning and a potential ruling on the 
territorial claims of Morocco and Mauritania.141 Another issue was that while referring to self-
determination the Court conceptualised it as a principle rather than a right, thus departing from 
the Namibia approach. In the opinion of Klabbers, here the court presumably changed its 
conception of self-determination as it became cautious and mindful about the possible 
implication of the right in the postcolonial context.142  
 To continue, the ICJ had another occasion to comment on self-determination in the 1986 
Frontier Dispute case. In this case, the Court's Chamber was asked to decide partly based on 
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the principle of uti possidetis, and in laying down the general acceptance of the uti possidetis 
principle, it invoked self-determination in support.143 Here also, just as in the case of Western 
Sahara, self-determination was construed as a principle and seen in a territorial manner, which 
indicates the cautiousness of the court.144 Furthermore, the 1995 East Timor (Portugal v. 
Australia) case is another important example for the ICJ jurisprudence on self-determination. 
While the Court dismissed the case, it noted that the principle of self-determination exists in 
positive international law and may even be viewed as having an erga omnes character.145  
 Meanwhile, other bodies, such as the Supreme Court of Canada have also referred to 
self-determination, specifically by emphasising the lack of enforceability.146 In its opinion on 
Quebec the Supreme Court of Canada held: “international law expects that the right to self-
determination will be exercised by peoples within the framework of existing sovereign states 
and consistently with the maintenance of the territorial integrity of those states.”147 
Nevertheless, the court highlighted that only self-determination would lead to secession in 
highly exceptional situations.148  
 Overall, the development of self-determination in international law has been well 
reflected in international jurisprudence. The fact that at the Wilsonian period self-determination 
was not yet a legal principle was reflected in the Aaland Islands case. Meanwhile, self-
determination eventually transformed into a firm right in the decolonisation period, as seen 
from the decisions on Namibia, Western Sahara, and East Timor. The relevant case law 
indicates the way self-determination was conceptualised to be in favour of secession in the 
decolonisation context to colonial peoples only. Thus, within the practice of the ICJ self-
determination has been reinstated as a substantive right in international law. Meanwhile, the 
relevant case law states that self-determination should not be considered “(…) exclusively a 
hard, substantive, and enforceable right that could ultimately include a right to secede, but that 
self-determination has been given a more limited meaning.”149 Regarding the postcolonial 
phase, the Quebec case indicated the reluctance of international law to allow secession outside 
the decolonisation context, while arguably leaving room for remedial secession. Nevertheless, 
as discussed, remedial secession has weak foundations, both, in theory, and practice and is a 
matter of further discussions.150 
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2. TOWARDS THE 1966 SOVIET APPROACH TO THE RIGHT OF PEOPLES TO 
SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
2.1. Self-determination and the Bolsheviks 
 
2.1.1. The Soviet Ideology and International Law 
 
 To contextualise the Soviet approach to self-determination, it is important to briefly 
discuss the ideological foundations of the Soviet legal thinking. Following the 1917 revolution, 
the Soviets tried to implement the Marxist ideology. They took significant steps to organise a 
world revolution, introduce the policy of military communism and nationalised large 
enterprises and banks, etc. Nonetheless, most of these policies failed before the death of Lenin. 
While the Soviet system lived until the collapse of the Soviet Union, “the real power belonged 
to the bureaucratic elite and not the people itself.”151 In fact, the USSR implemented only some 
of the Marxist objectives by creating new imbalances and ignoring some points of the Marxist 
ideology completely.152 Nevertheless, the Marxist foundations of Soviet legal thinking created 
difficulties for the Soviet legal thinking. This is because the Marxist thinking saw the law as an 
instrument of oppression of one social class by another one holding: “(…) the state and law 
accordingly should wither away.”153 Nevertheless, the interplay of law and Marxian ideology 
was interpreted differently by various legal scholars.154 Thus, the provisions of law in general 
and international law, in particular, were subjected to Soviet interpretations. As a result, the 
Soviets developed a unique anti-Western understanding of international law. 
 The Soviets challenged the universality of international law and claimed the existence 
of a regional international law by claimimg that a distinct ‘Soviet’ or ‘socialist’ international 
law existed.155 One of the main challenges related to the Soviet legal thinking was the gap 
between theory and practice as “actual life often did not correspond to legal texts as e.g. in the 
case of the right of peoples to self-determination.”156 Some of the most important principles of 
contemporary international law were generated by the contradictions of Soviet international.157 
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Thus, the complexities of the Soviet legal thinking were reflected in their understanding of self-
determination, which is discussed in the following sections.  
 
2.1.2. The Bolshevik Approach to Self-determination  
 
 While discussing the Wilsonian idea of self-determination it was slightly mentioned that 
Lenin was also one of the earliest proponents of self-determination.158 In fact,  he was the first 
to propagate the establishment of self-determination as a right for the liberation of peoples.159 
At the time the distinctions between Lenin’s and Wilson’s understandings of self-determination 
were not clear as both criticised imperialism and advocated peace based on the principle of self-
determination. The most significant difference, however, was that Wilson was at the time more 
powerful and capable of influencing international relations than Lenin.160 Until 1919 Wilson 
was the only one who had both the will and the power “(…) to produce a settlement that would 
implement self-determination as a principle of the international order.”161 Hence, the 
discussions on self-determination are greatly associated with Wilson rather than Lenin.  
 Nevertheless, Lenin’s understanding had little in common with the Wilsonian liberal 
democratic concept of self-determination since the advancement of civil and political rights was 
not the main concern of the Bolsheviks.162 The features of Lenin’s ideas of self-determination 
are well structured already in his early works. For example, in  December 1913 he discussed 
the subject in a short article called “The Cadets and The Right of Nations to Self-
Determination” where he emphasised the way the right to self-determination differed from 
secession, maintaining that the “(…)advocacy of the right to self-determination is very 
important in the fight against the abscess of nationalism in all its forms.”163 Furthermore, Lenin 
advanced his understanding of the principle in another article, claiming self-determination to 
be understood as the right to secede and to achieve independence.164 Thus, from the very 
beginning, Lenin’s understanding was that self-determination entailed secession.  
 The same ideas resurfaced in his later works and speeches, amongst which the 1916 
“Theses on the Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination” is of high 
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importance.165 Here, Lenin explicitly stated that “the right of nations to self-determination 
means only the right to independence in a political sense, the right to free, political secession 
from the oppressing nation.”166 In the same work, Lenin stipulated that the proletariat across 
the globe should base their struggle on the right to self-determination.167 Finally, elsewhere 
Lenin contended that the realisation of self-determination in imperialist countries and the 
liberation of colonial peoples would be possible only with revolutions.168  
 To continue, already in March 1917, Lenin declared that the peace plan of the 
Bolsheviks would be the “(…) liberation of all colonies; the liberation of all dependent, 
oppressed, and non-sovereign peoples.”169 Nevertheless, given that self-determination was “the 
political extension of Lenin’s primarily economic analysis of imperialism,” the presumed 
liberation of the oppressed peoples would eventually contribute to the success of the socialist 
revolution.170 This is crystallised in “The Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia” 
adopted by the Bolshevik party on 15 November 1917.171 In this document, the Bolsheviks 
explicitly recognised the right to secession from Russia, nevertheless, as Mälksoo argues, the 
final goal was to reconstruct the Tsarist Empire based on Marxist- Leninist principles.172 
 Overall, Lenin’s understanding of self-determination could be invoked in the following 
cases: 1) by ethnic or national groups to decide their future, 2) in the aftermath of the conflict 
between sovereign states for the allocation of territories to one or another power, 3) to lead the 
liberation of all colonial countries.173 Nevertheless, while Lenin saw secession as a means to 
achieve independence, the ultimate goal was the integration of nations in a socialist world and 
not the independence of those nations itself.174 Thus, after all, Lenin’s idea of self-determination 
was based on socialism, in contrast to the Wilsonian idea of self-determination, which was 
based on liberal-democratic thought. Also, while for Lenin self-determination was a 
revolutionary principle instrumentalised against the European empires, Wilson hoped that self-
determination would become a tool against revolutionary challenges to existing orders.175  
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2.1.3. The Bolshevik Practice of Self-determination 
 
 When it comes to the Bolsheviks practice to self-determination, it is noteworthy that 
after coming to power, they started criticising the European Allies for their hypocrisy. To 
illustrate, Trotsky claimed that the imperial powers could not claim to be fighting for the rights 
of small nations in Europe while oppressing other national groups within their empires.176 
Nevertheless, while the Bolshevik criticism of the Western approach to self-determination is 
not unfounded and has been discussed in the previous section,177 similar criticism is relevant 
regarding the Bolshevik approach to self-determination. A counter-argument to the Bolsheviks’ 
anti-imperial criticism is that the Bolsheviks themselves were hypocritical while using self-
determination as it was meant to further advance their ideological and political agenda.178 Lenin 
himself had indicated that self-determination was in a subordinate position in his Theses where 
he postulated the necessity to subordinate the struggle for self-determination to that of the 
revolutionary struggle to achieve socialism.179 
 The contradictions of the Bolshevik anti-imperial rhetoric of self-determination and the 
practice are well articulated by a prominent scholar of Soviet history, Ronald Suny, who argues 
that the Soviet Union was “(…) the most unique empire in the twentieth century,”180 which 
became an empire even though its founders had different intentions. Most importantly, Suny 
notes that while Lenin imagined the Soviet Union as a structure maintaining “nonexploitative 
relations among nations, a model for further integration of the other countries and the fragments 
of the European empires,”181 in practice “the Soviet Union replicated imperialist relations,”182 
where the center had a greater power vis a vis the periphery. More specifically, this was evident 
in the effort to regather Russian lands “in conditions of civil war, foreign intervention, and state 
collapse by a relatively-centralized party and the Red Army.”183 
 To continue, the Bolsheviks imagined the application of self-determination in 2 stages: 
1) proclamation of independent Soviet Republics in separatist regions, 2) recognition of the 
representative of the subject nation by the Bolshevik government in Moscow. In other words, 
the process was understood as the recognition of the Bolshevik leadership of the subject nation 
by the Russian Bolsheviks. This is how the Soviet Russia recognised the independence of 
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Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in December 1918. Nevertheless, the independence of those 
nations was achieved militarily. In other words, the Soviets did not easily let go of the imperial 
territories and did not easily grant secession based on the principle of self-determination.184 
 To illustrate, in Estonia proclaimed Bolshevik national formations faced military 
resistance from those nationalists who wanted self-determination in the “bourgeois fashion.”185 
Estonia's war of secession was characterised by the remarkable fact that she initially fought the 
Red Army side by side with the Russian Whites.186 In their act of recognition of the 
independence of the three Baltic states, the Soviets emphasised that these states would 
eventually voluntarily merge based on self-determination and of the acquisition of power by 
the working class.187 Interestingly, when Estonia’s independence was proclaimed on 24 
February 1918, and after the Bolsheviks established the Provisional Government in November 
1918, the Red Army stood ready to put an end to Estonia's new independence. While the 
Bolsheviks were able to set up a Moscow-controlled puppet government, the “Estonian 
Worker's Commune,” it lasted only a few months.188 As the following section indicates, 
revolutionary Russia,  later  crushed “(…) the freedom of the working class in particular.”189  
 
2.1.4. The Promise and the Practice of Self-determination in the Soviet Peace Treaties 
of 1920 
 
 The Soviet practice of self-determination indicates that while propagating the principle 
of self-determination publicly, they took a different approach in practice. This is exemplified 
by the history developed around the 1920-1921 Soviet Peace treaties, where self-determination 
was used as a basis for the recognition of the independence of certain states.190 These treaties 
are significant from the perspective of international law as it was the first time that “(…) 
secession was expressis verbis recognised based on the right of peoples to self-
determination.”191 As discussed, at the time of the Aaland Islands dispute self-determination 
did not have such status under the League of Nations.192 Thus, the Soviets were ahead of the 
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rest of the world by including the principle in their bilateral international treaties with the Baltic 
states and Georgia. To illustrate, Article 2 of the Tartu Peace Treaty, signed between Soviet 
Russia and the Republic of Estonia on 2 February 1920 proclaimed the recognition of Estonia’s 
Independence based on the right of peoples to self-determination, which granted Estonia the 
right to secession, renouncing Russia’s sovereignty over Estonia’s territories.193 
 It is argued that self-determination was included in these Peace Treaties only because 
these nations had fought for independence militarily and the Soviets had no choice but recognise 
it. Moreover, self-determination was used tactically to explain the loss of these territories 
domestically. Be it as it may, the real problem was that the Russian Bolsheviks did not uphold 
this standard in practice.194 For example, throughout the whole period of Estonia’s 
independence the Russian Bolsheviks, in cooperation with the local Bolsheviks used 
“legitimate, semi-legitimate, and secret underground channels” to subvert the power in 
Estonia”195  Estonians, well aware of the situation, made it clear that the highest power belonged 
to them and did not tolerate political disloyalty towards the Estonian state. The Estonian 
newspapers continuously accused the Russians of “having chauvinist Russian monarchist 
hopes,”196 of “lamenting their lost hegemony.”197 Everything was pointing to the direction that 
the Soviets did not appreciate the practice of self-determination of Estonians, which they had 
themselves included in the Tartu Peace treaty.  
 As time went by, the Soviet moves towards Estonia became more aggressive. To 
illustrate, on 1 December 1924 attempted to stage a coup but failed to achieve their goal. The 
attempts of the Soviets to subvert the power in Estonia demonstrate the hypocrisy and the 
tactical use of the principle of self-determination by the Bolsheviks. As Mälksoo argues in case 
the coup was successful Soviet Estonia “(…) would have petitioned to join the USSR – and 
Estonia would have maintained both ‘sovereignty’ and ‘self-determination’; only that instead 
of capitalists, the workers themselves would have come to power.”198 This is the way the 
Soviets would advance their interests by instrumentalising the language of international law. 
 Nevertheless, the Soviets eventually achieved their desire of Sovietising Estonia in line 
with Latvia, Lithuania and Romania’s Bessarabia on 23 August 1939 when they concluded the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.199 Most importantly, the Soviets tried quite hard to create the 
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appearance that the so-called reunification “(…) was entirely voluntary, an expression of the 
will of their peoples.”200 For example, on 22 September 1939, the Estonian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Karl Selter, left for Moscow to sign a Soviet-Estonian trade treaty. The Estonian side 
had no alternative but to conclude a Mutual Aid Pact authorising the Soviets a great power in 
Estonia. Shortly after this, the Soviet army crossed the Estonian border.201 Estonia formally 
became a member of the USSR on 6 August 1940, following Estonia’s petition for admission 
to the USSR. In the end, communism came to Estonia only when the Soviets threatened to use 
military force.202  
 Following the realisation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the Soviet authorities 
fabricated an official narrative, according to which they have liberated these states from 
fascism. A specific role was given to the line of the narrative of a popular revolution headed by 
“Zhdanov, Vyshinsky and Dekanozov (and sinister agents such as the Estonian Karl Säre).”203 
Moreover, to support this line of arguments, the Soviets pointed towards the 21 July 1940 
pronouncements issued by the legislators of the Baltic states, which approved the incorporation. 
Nevertheless, they remained silent about the fact that this was based on “mock-elections 
conducted in violation of the constitutions of the Baltic States.”204 Most importantly, the Soviets   
refused to admit that in 1940 the Baltics states acceded the Soviet Union under the pressure of 
the Soviet ultimatum of “approval or annihilation.”205 Nonetheless, most Western States refused 
to recognise the validity of the Soviet incorporation of the Baltic States.  
 Going back to the fate of Georgia, things developed faster than in Estonia. Following 
the conclusion of the Moscow treaty in 1920, the Bolsheviks annexed Georgia with the invasion 
of the Red Army in February 1921.206 With this move, the Russian Bolsheviks set aside the 
principle of self-determination and advanced their plans for restoring the imperial borders.207 
While Georgians established the Georgian National Liberation Movement following the 
incorporation of their country into the Soviet Union in December 1922, their efforts were 
defeated by the Bolsheviks.208 It is worth mentioning that while the Bolshevik policy in the 
1920s encouraged the policy of korenizatsiya, i. e. national consciousness among the 
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nationalities, and in some cases created nations,209 it was less advantageous “(…) for the more 
nationally conscious Georgians (and Armenians), who had deeply rooted national traditions and 
had experienced a recent period of embattled independence.”210 In the following years the 
regime became ever more centralised and the relationship between center and republics was 
one of subordination.211  
 Altogether, the Bolsheviks interpreted the practice of self-determination in light of the 
goals of Communism rather than the ideals of independence of nations. Their understanding of 
self-determination had strong propaganda and tactical elements and the practice was directed 
towards “restoring the borders of the Russian Empire.”212 This was exemplified by their practice 
of the Soviet peace treaties. The Bolsheviks saw no contradictions in their application of the 
right as they thought that the Russian Empire was rebuilt as a union of sovereign states where 
people enjoyed the right to self-determination fully.213 The kind of thinking that the issue of 
self-determination was resolved in the Soviet Union was crystalised in the decolonisation 
period when the USSR took the lead of promoting the right on an international level.  
 
2.2. The USSR and Self-determination in the Decolonisation Period   
 
2.2.1. The USSR’s Understanding of Self-determination upon the Decolonisation Period  
 
 The discussion on the development of self-determination in the decolonisation period 
provided a timeline of the evolution of self-determination in international law in general 
terms.214 Nevertheless, this part of the analysis specifically focuses on the way the Soviets 
contributed to this process. Hence, it is important to first understand the political climate, which 
made the Soviet influence on the matter possible. To illustrate, the Post-WWII decolonisation 
period was characterised by the universal acceptance of nation-statehood as the alternative to 
imperialism.215 Besides, serious issues of race and identity reappeared in the southern and 
central African regions in the late 1940s.216 Meanwhile, by the end of WWII, the role of the 
USSR was getting stronger internationally and it had great control of Eastern European 
countries. What is more, with the rise of the bi-polar system in international relations, the voice 
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of the Soviets mattered more than ever before. Furthermore, the politics at the time was defined 
by the growth of mass character with the participation of “110 million people from 72 states.”217 
Besides, at the time the UN in contrast to the League of Nations was more resourceful and had 
more effective instruments at hand and was willing “(…) to create on the basis of new principles 
(human rights, self-determination, sovereign equality of states) a powerful and effective 
international legal system.”218 
 Another important factor explaining the Soviet confidence in promoting the right to self-
determination internationally was that During the Cold War, the USSR saw itself having 
fulfilled the self-determination aspirations of numerous peoples with autonomic units in a 
federal structure and with reforms and promotion of national cultures in the USSR, and 
perceived self-determination applicable to other states only.219 Nevertheless, the reality was 
different as “in the Western liberal sense (emphasizing democracy and human rights) there was 
no ‘internal self-determination’ within the USSR either, presumably not even for the Russian 
people.”220 Despite this, the USSR started promoting self-determination, as a tool to further 
advance their policy goals, becoming the original instigator of decolonisation.221  
 Overall, it is under such political climate and self-assessment of the internal reality that 
the Soviets gained confidence in their power to advance the principle of self-determination 
internationally in cooperation with the socialist states and Third world countries, having a major 
influence on international law.222 When an article on self-determination was included in the UN 
Charter it was done based on the proposal of the Soviet delegation.223 Furthermore, the role of 
the Soviets was also decisive in the creation of the 1960 UNGA Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which entailed the acceptance of self-
determination as a right in the colonial context.224 This culminated in 1966, “when self-
determination was codified as a qualified right under the 1966 UN Covenants.”225 
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2.2.2. The Soviet Union and the Debates on Self-determination in the 1966 Covenants 
 
 The preceding analysis indicated that following WWII the Soviets applied different 
legal and political norms domestically and internationally.226 The USSR objected to any 
criticism similar to the anti-imperial and anti-colonial criticism directed towards the “West 
European states and their former colonial empires.227 In fact, the USSR insisted that self-
determination had already been expressed in the USSR, for itself prioritising state sovereignty 
and territorial integrity.228 Meanwhile, the West was not ready to accept the right to secession, 
however, eventually acknowledged its possibility in the colonial context.229 The Soviets 
suggested adding a provision on self-determination to the Covenant in the Third Committee of 
the UNGA already in 1950. They were primarily concerned by the right of self-determination 
of colonial peoples, the secondary concern was the right of minorities. The proposal was 
rejected and Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia took the initiative in their hands by introducing a 
draft resolution suggesting the Commission on Human Rights to study the subject and take 
measures accordingly. Nevertheless, the Saudis and other third world countries focused on 
colonial peoples, whereas, Afghanistan and other Asian, African and Latin American states 
insisted that the right should also apply to peoples oppressed by despotic governments.230  
 Under these circumstances, the Soviet Union continued to insist that self-determination 
should be limited to colonial peoples only. Hence, they drafted new proposals, the first one 
addressed to the GA in 1951 and the second one dealt with in the Commission on Human Rights 
in 1952. This was endorsed by socialist states and the majority of Third World countries. 
Meanwhile, the Western states particularly the United Kingdom, France, Belgium opposed any 
provision on self-determination. These states were pursuing their colonial interests but tried to 
justify their opposition by relying on other arguments such as that self-determination is merely 
a political principle rather than a legal right and did not fit into the Covenant as it was a 
collective right. One of the gravest concerns including the right in the Covenants was about the 
way the possible inclusion of the right in the Covenant would affect the territorial integrity of 
states. Most importantly, they stressed that if included the right should apply to the people of 
sovereign states suppressed by their own governments.231  
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 ICCPR and ICESCR were adopted by the UNGA in 1966 and have since been ratified 
by the overwhelming majority of UN Member States.232 However, as discussed, the context 
was decolonisation and the Covenants allowed secession for colonies only and internal self-
determination to minorities.233 Following the inclusion of self-determination in the 1966 
documents, the UNGA ensured the recognition of  the national liberation movements “as the 
“sole legitimate representatives” of the relevant peoples.”234 Nevertheless, as Bowring argues, 
it was not the result of the Soviet propaganda only but “the logic of the new international law 
developed through the efforts of the USSR and its allies.”235  
 Meanwhile, the history that followed indicated that the Soviets once again challenged 
their approach to self-determination themselves. It all started with a political crisis in 
Czechoslovakia, which developed into a “struggle for a more pluralistic concept of 
socialism.”236 The developments in Czechoslovakia were seen as problematic and dangerous 
by the Soviets.237 Henceforth, the Communist leaders met to discuss the situation and the 
possible solution. The proposals of the Communist leaders were eventually accepted, following 
“a studiously prolonged Warsaw Pact exercise on the Czechoslovak territory, and Russian troop 
maneuvers near the Czech border,” 238. Nevertheless, a few weeks later, the agreement was 
broken by the military invasion of Czechoslovakia.239 The Warsaw Pact invaders directed 
“highly intense coercion against the territorial integrity and political independence of 
Czechoslovakia.”240 As a justification, the Soviets produced an unsigned document implying 
that Czech leaders “invited” the Warsaw Pact forces to enter Czechoslovakia.”241 This was 
indeed not the same as the right of self-determination in the Western liberal sense, however, 
“(…) the Soviets did not want to see the irony and the contradiction in their policies.”242  
 When it comes to the the Soviet legal scholars, they either paid no attention to the 
importance of self-determination or replicated the official stance portraying the Soviets as the 
liberators of colonial peoples. For example, while discussing the attitude of some of the most 
famous Soviet scholars, Bowring claims that Pashukanis did not recognise the significance of 
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self-determination for international law.243 Meanwhile, he concludes that Tunkin pointed the 
great role of the Soviets for liberating the colonies with the advancement of the right of peoples 
to self-determination in the decolonisation period, later linking “(…) the “struggle for 
international peace and security” with the “struggle for the freedom and independence of 
peoples.”244 Nevertheless, following the collapse of the Soviet Union the situation changed as 
some scholars such as Blischenco started suggesting to rethink the formation of the history of 
conotemporary international law and that of self-determination not within the frames of the 
1917 October Revolution but the French bourgeois revolution.245 
 Thus, by the end of the decolonisation period, the Soviets and the Western countries had 
different understandings of the right of peoples to self-determination. The Soviet use of self-
determination remained situational and conflicting.246 The key difference between the Soviet 
and Western approaches to self-determination was first of all ideological. While the Soviets 
acknowledged self-determination and even promoted it as allowing secession way before 
anyone else in international law, their end goal was not the independence of national groups, 
but rather the goals of communism. While in theory, the Soviets allowed secession for the 
highest levels of the SSRs, this was limited in reality as, in practice, the Soviets took all efforts 
to restore the borders of the Russian Empire.247 The Soviets used self-determination 
instrumentally and hypocritically as a means to achieve their foreign policy goals. What is more, 
they applied double-standards at home and abroad, contending that the issue of self-
determination was resolved in their territory. The paradox and hypocrisy of the Soviet thinking 
were exemplified by their support for the decolonisation of the (West) European colonies and 
lack of self-reflection and self-criticism. While the Soviets were convinced that the issue of 
self-determination was resolved in their territories and started propagating the liberation of the 
West European Colonies the practice had indicated that the actual implementation of self-
determination was impossible in the Soviet Union.248  
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3. TOWARDS THE RUSSIAN APPROACH TO THE RIGHT OF PEOPLES TO 
SELF-DETERMINATION IN CRIMEA 
 
3.1. The Soviet Legal Thinking and Russia  
 
 While talking about the link between the Soviet and Russian approaches to self-
determination one may wonder whether it is justified to search for answers regarding the 
contradictions found in Russia’s current understanding of the right to self-determination in the 
Soviet past. Answering this question is essential, considering that following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, Russia resorted to capitalism, presumably leaving behind the Soviet ideology 
based on Marxism. Hence, one must first find out whether or not during the transition period 
Russia completely left behind the Soviet legal thinking or no, and if the answer is in the 
negative, identify the ways the Soviet ideology influenced the Russian legal doctrine. This will 
reinstate the validity and the importance of the historical-legal approach adopted by this study.  
One of the most important issues during the transition of Russia from the Soviet Union 
was the question of state succession and continuity. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Russia’s President Yeltsin proposed the doctrine of state continuity, among other things 
claiming that it would continue the membership of the Soviet Union in the UN.249 Despite some 
concerns and disagreements, Russia’s claim to membership was accepted eventually. 250 While 
the legal doctrine of state continuity was problematic, the P5 members did not challenge 
Russia’s proposal as they did not want to open the Pandora’s Box of the SC.251 Despite the legal 
debates revolved around Russia’s proposed doctrine of state continuity,  the main point is that 
by invoking it Russia pledged to maintain legal continuity with the Soviet Union inheriting the 
rights and obligations of the Soviet Union.252  What is more, it retained the Soviet federal 
formula and the understanding of self-determination. At the time Russia thought of the issue of 
self-determination to be solved within the federation and was only applicable to other states.253   
Nevertheless, the transition of Russia from the USSR to the RF in 1990 was 
accompanied by the declaration of sovereignty and the precedence of Russian law over that of 
the USSR.254 In other words, while Russia became the legal successor of the Soviet Union, or 
even maintained state continuity with it in terms of international law, it went on a capitalist path 
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abandoning the Soviet ideology in favour of the capitalist one.255 As a result, the end of the 
Cold War signaled the end of the bipolar system and capitalism remained absolute since there 
was no opposing ideology such as communism.256 This trend was also reflected in the 1993 
Russian Constitution,257 which signified “(…) a complete departure from the Communist 
dictatorship and a passage to democratic government.”258 Nonetheless, as history illustrated, 
the assumptions that Russia abandoned the Soviet past overnight, completely freeing herself 
from Marxist ideology, were hasty. While Russia’s transition was very smooth, the Soviet past 
followed it long after. As Isaeva contends, it would not be correct to confidently claim that after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ousting of communist ideology the post-Soviet space 
completely adopted the western model of liberalism.259  
 The arguments that the ghost of the Soviet legal thinking could not abandon the post-
Soviet space immediately are based on the uniqueness and complexities of Russia’s history.260 
The uniqueness of history is indeed an important factor, given that the legitimacy and the 
complexity of Russia’s statehood are found in its history of succession without a break from 
the Kievan Rusan empire.261 When it comes to the Soviet past specifically, Feldbrugge argues: 
“(…) the fact that Stalin’s Russia was victorious in WWII, made the Stalinist past less easily 
digestible.”262 Some other factors, which define the distinctiveness of Russia’s history and are 
influential on Russia’s current legal thinking are well articulated by Mälksoo:  
“In Russia’s case, the country’s historically unique on and off and periodically 
hostile relationship with Europe and nowadays the West, its historically established 
tendency of authoritarian government, relative weakness of the rule of law inside 
the country, and the utmost desire to preserve the territorial integrity of Russia as 
the world’s largest territorial state have decisively shaped post-Soviet Russia’s 
approaches to international law.”263 
 Another point which makes the historical perspective valid is that the constant line 
throughout the long period of Russia’s history is the construction of Russia as a Great Power.264 
Besides, Putin’s Russia has seen a “(…) come-back of arguments on historical, cultural, and 
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civilizational distinctiveness in debates about international law.”265 Thus, it is evident that 
Russia’s history and specifically the transition from the Soviet Union had serious consequences 
for Russia’s legal thinking in general and the further development of Russia’s approach to the 
right of peoples to self-determination in particular. To name a few, due to the conflict of the 
past and present ideologies, internal cotradictions accompanied the Russian theory of 
international law.266 What is more, upon the transition from the Soviet Union, the new western 
ideas and concepts were not either simplified or distorted, resulting in the lack of a high level 
of legal rhetoric. Most importantly, the Russian doctrine did not participate in the Western 
discourse as an equal member, thus not influenced it.267 These observations also play out in the 
historical analysis of Russia’s approach to the right of peoples to self-determination.  
 Another point, which makes the analysis of the right of peoples to self-determination 
from a historical-legal perspective important is that the neglect of fundamental theoretical issues 
related to the history of international law and self-determination is one of the biggest problems 
of the current Russian legal doctrine. These topics are not subjected to serious analysis resulting 
in the formation of scholasticism and false theories.268 Hence, it can be inferred that the lack of 
new discussions, in line with the lack of challenge and self-criticism towards Russia’s past 
thinking on the matter might have as well reinstated the Soviet legal thinking, In other words, 
the contradictions found in Russia’s current legal approach to the right of peoples to self-
determination may be a result of the Soviet thinking disguised under the Western or universal 
approach. A similar point is made by Mälksoo who, while talking about the Soviet approach to 
self-determination claims: “it seems that the flexible approach to key legal categories has not 
disappeared from post-Soviet Russia either.”269 Thus, it is not only valid to analyse the Russian 
approaches to self-determination from the perspective of the Soviet approach, but also 
necessary, given the lack of critical legal scholarship on the matter.  
 All in all, the conclusion is that Russian has a unique understanding of self-
determination “which is not exactly western in its essence.” Most importantly, the Soviet legal 
doctrine, “goes to the heart of the peculiarities of modern Russian legal thinking.”270 Altogether, 
one must not neglect or undervalue the role of Soviet thinking while discussing Russia’s 
understanding as history only adds to the complete picture of the study.271 As Mälksoo argues, 
the study of contemporary Russian approaches to international law requires a meaningful points 
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of comparison, hence, the comparison of the Russian Federation to its predecessor, the USSR 
is justified.272 
 
3.2. Russia’s Approach to Self-determination before the 1999 NATO intervention to 
Kosovo  
 
 To understand the development of Russian approaches to self-determination following 
the annexation of Crimea, one must inevitably look at the situation before Crimea, specifically 
before the escalation of the conflict in Kosovo. Hence, the discussion in this part focuses on the 
key trends and the foreign policy imperatives, which shaped Russia’s contradictory narratives 
on the secession/right to self-determination, marking the trend of the relativisation and 
politicisation of international law.273 The general picture is that throughout the 1991-2013 
period Russia strongly opposed the interpretation of self-determination outside the colonial 
context.274 In other words, Russia did not approve unilateral secession outside the 
decolonisation context. Russia’s approach in this period and following Crimea has been shaped 
by several foreign policy factors such as ethnofederalism, Russian diaspora, the sphere of 
influence and a policy of passportisation.275  
 In the 1990s Russia’s main concern was the secessionist aspirations of its nationalities, 
Chechnya in particular, and this concern was reflected in its domestic jurisprudence.276 Russia 
tried to maintain its territories by the 1992 Federal Treaty and later 1993 Constitution, the latter 
took a very strong stance against unilateral secession, emphasising on the importance of 
territorial integrity of states.277 Despite these efforts, Chechnya and Tatarstan attempted 
secession. While Russia was able to conclude a Treaty of a peaceful settlement with Tatarstan, 
the situation with Chechnya ended with two bloody wars and eventually, Russia re-established 
its control on the ground.278 At this period Russia’s position was visible in its periodic reports 
submitted to the Human Rights Committee in 1995, 2002, 2008 and 2013 respectively.279 The 
analysis of these reports indicates that Russia understood self-determination outside the 
decolonisation context to be allowed only internally. Eventually, the Russian Constitutional 
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Court reinstated this position in its two major decisions concerning Tatarstan and Chechnya 
concluding against the possibility of secession.280  
 Furthermore, going back to the other factors, which shaped Russia’s approach to self-
determination, one sees that following the collapse of the Soviet Union, over 25 million 
Russians became a minority in the former Soviet countries, specifically in the autonomous Units 
and SSRs, thus resulting in a more pro-Russian political elite.281 Hence, following the collapse 
of the Soviet Union one of Russia’s key foreign policy goals was to become the defender of the 
compatriots abroad.282 To achieve the policy objectives, Moscow often resorted to the 
provisions of domestic and international law. In this context, Russia assumed the existence of 
serious security threats directed against the Russian-speaking people, and presumably served to 
legitimise Russia’s military intervention.283 Apart from this, Russia developed the so-called 
concept of the Russian Sphere of Influence. Specifically, the idea was introduced in 1992 and 
implied that Russia will not leave the territories that have been under its influence for centuries. 
The discourse on the sphere of influence transformed into one of interest in the 2000s, when 
for example, Putin called CIS the sphere of Russia’s interest.284 Last but not least, Russia’s 
policy of passportisation, has also contributed to Russia’s complicated relations with the former 
SSRs. Russia’s liberal law on Nationality, allowed the citizens of the former USSR to apply for 
citizenship, which was rejected by countries such as Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova.285  
 Nevertheless, even though Russia’s foreign policy agenda created the focal points for 
Russia’s expansionist policies, causing some tensions in the region, Russia did not take any 
direct steps against the territorial integrity of these states.286 While Russia contributed to the 
regional conflicts, it did not recognise secessionist claims to independence in the region, 
remaining committed to the inherited borders.287 At this period Russia understood people as a 
population as a whole, rather than the separatist unit.288 Russia’s commitment to the territorial 
integrity of states was emphasised in the 1995  “Memorandum on the maintenance of peace and 
stability in the CIS” which was submitted by Russia to the Heads of State of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States.289 In this document, the CIS States declared to take measures against 
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separatism.290 Nevertheless, the situation changed throughout time in line with major 
geopolitical changes in the region, which is discussed in the following section. 
 
3.3. Russia’s Approach to Self-determination after the 1999 NATO Intervention to 
Kosovo 
 
 The 1990s and early 2000s were significant for interesting geopolitical trends both in 
the West and Russia. To be specific, the period was signified for institution building and 
expansion, especially in Europe. The EU expansion continued by the addition of new members 
from Eastern Europe, moreover, NATO expanded by admitting former members of the Warsaw 
Pact.291 While the West was optimistic that Russia would become a member one day, Russia 
perceived this as a threat and Russia’s foreign policy narratives were dominated by the 
frustration of the expansion of NATO and the EU. This theme was reiterated in the statements 
of state officials.292 As for Russia, the country’s internal situation was signified by the transition 
from the rule of Yeltsin to the rule of Putin. Yeltsin’s Russia had become an internationally 
insignificant player and domestically it turned into a “(…) rudeless and powerless conglomerate 
of completing clans and regions, with the president as the only fixed point.”293 Given that 
Yeltsin’s popularity was dwindling significantly and there was a popular demand for order and 
predictability, “Putin gave the nation what they wanted.”294 
 It is in light of these geopolitical developments that the secessionist conflict escalated 
in Kosovo in 1999, which was followed by the NATO intervention. Specifically, the situation 
deteriorated following the 1998 launch of an offensive by the Kosovo Liberation Army.295 After 
several massacres of ethnic Albanian civilians and the failure to reach an agreement at 
Rambouillet, NATO intervened without the UNSC authorisation.296 NATO tried to justify the 
intervention in humanitarian terms and the UNSC resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999, authorised 
the provisional government. The status talks were carried out by the UN Special Envoy Martti 
Ahtisaari, who, however, avoided mentioning “independence” or “territorial integrity of 
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Serbia.”297 Following the failure of negotiations, Kosovo declared independence unilaterally on 
17 February 2008.298 The Declaration relied on remedial secession and earned sovereignty 
schemes, thus providing guidelines for the recognition of Kosovo.299 Eventually, many 
countries recognised Kosovo relying specifically on the “Earned Sovereignty” scheme.300  
 The NATO intervention in Yugoslavia triggered the most alarming turn in Russian–
Western relations since the end of the Cold War, as “Russia and NATO found themselves on 
opposite sides of an armed conflict.”301 Following Kosovo’s declaration of independence, in 
2008, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov called Kosovo’s potential separation from Serbia a 
subversion of all the foundations of international law. In Russia’s view, even action by the 
UNSC could not legalise secession against the wishes of the pre-existing State.302 In 2010 
Serbia filed a request at the UN seeking the opinion of the ICJ, nevertheless, the ICJ decision 
caused dissatisfaction as the court concluded that the act of declaration of Kosovo’s 
independence did not infringe the provisions of international law.303 The opinion of ICJ has had 
profound relevance for other states including Russia.304 Given Russia’s strong relations with 
Serbia and the fears over similar interpretations in the case of Chechnya, Russia openly 
criticised the ICJ's opinion, refusing to recognise the independence of Kosovo.305 Hence, 
Russia’s approach at the time was that unilateral secession was not allowed outside the 
decolonisation context. In its written submission to the ICJ in the Kosovo proceedings, Russia 
interpreted the Safeguard Clause of the Friendly Relations Declaration as such:  
“the Russian Federation is of the view that the primary purpose of the “safeguard 
clause” is to serve as a guarantee of territorial integrity of States. It is also true that 
the clause may be construed as authorizing secession under certain conditions. 
However, those conditions should be limited to truly extreme circumstances, such 
as an outright armed attack by the parent State, threatening the very existence of the 
people in question.306 
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 Here the main take is that for the first time Russia refered to the argument of remedial 
secession. Even though Russia did not accept the possibility of remedial secession for Kosovo, 
it did imply the possibility of secession under very strict circumstances in general.307 What is 
more, following Russia’s invasion of Georgia, there was a significant shift from arguments 
based on territorial integrity to those related to the protection of co-nationals or co-ethnics.308 
Russia formally recognised the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia on 26 August 
2008. While the formal declaration mainly referred to political motives, it also contained legal 
arguments referring to international instruments on self-determination.309 Nevertheless, the 
most significant moment was that Russia invoked remedial secession in support of the 
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.310 For Russia, it seemed logical that the events in 
Kosovo would eventually lead to similar scenarios in these secessionist entities.311 
  All in all, following Kosovo’s declaration of independence, Russia’s stance on self-
determination and secession changed dramatically.312 While before 2008 Russia understood 
self-determination outside the decolonisation to be possible only internally, excluding the 
possibility of secession, however, after Kosovo declared independence, Russia shifted her long 
consistent narrative. In light of the events in Georgia and later Ukraine, Russia targeted the 
Soviet autonomous subunits and started linking remedial secession to referendums and the will 
of the people.313 
 
3.4. The  2014 Annexation of Crimea: Background of the Case 
 
 The annexation of Crimea in 2014 followed a series of events, which Russia perceived 
as a threat directed against her positions in the so-called sphere of influence. Specifically, 
Ukraine’s attempt to sign an Association Agreement with the EU was anything but acceptable 
to Russia. Ukraine was supposed to sign the Agreement with the EU in November 2013. 
Nevertheless, Russia warned that in such a case she would support “(…) the partitioning of 
Ukraine to protect ethnic Russians residing there.”314 Moscow believed that inciting a dispute 
framed as one of self-determination would hinder Ukraine’s European integration.315  
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 Russia annexed Crimea by a municipal law in March 2014, several events followed this 
act such as the armed intervention of Russian forces by the so-called “little green men,”316 a 
referendum, and a declaration of independence in Crimea.317 For the referendum two questions 
were presented: 1) Do you support the reunification of Crimea with Russia as a subject of the 
Russian Federation?; 2) Do you support the restoration of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Crimea of 1992 and the status of Crimea as a part of Ukraine?318 Russia made sure that there 
are no obstacles in the path of the referendum by vetoing a draft UNSC Resolution which was 
aimed at declaring the referendum illegal.319 Thus, the referendum went as planned and 
according to the officially reported results, 96.77 percent voted for the first option.320  
 To continue, Ukraine acted accordingly. To be specific, the acting president of the 
country suspended the Crimean decree that had called the referendum and later submitted a 
question to the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on the legality of the decree. The Court held 
that the territorial change would be possible only under an all-Ukrainian referendum and that 
only the parliament of Ukraine had the authority to call such a referendum. Consequently, the 
Constitutional Court mandated that the Crimean authorities repeal the referendum decree. Thus, 
the Crimea case revolved around the complexities of violations of domestic and international 
legal norms. Despite this, following the referendum, Russia’s President Putin signed an 
executive order to recognise Crimea. The next step was informing the relevant bodies that local 
Crimean institutions had proposed joining the RF. This was followed by the signature of an 
agreement regarding the incorportation of the Republic of Crimea into the RF.321  
 The reaction of the international community was expressed in the announcement of 
many states of not recognising the Crimean independence referendum or subsequent 
annexation. The United States made its views known in multiple forums and countries such as 
France, the United Kingdom and Germany acted similarly. Moreover, Japan invoked “the 
municipal illegality of the referendum and the premature character of Russia’s recognition of 
Crimea’s putative independence and suggested that changes to the territorial status quo brought 
about by force are inadmissible.”322 Still, other states with outstanding territorial disputes or 
secessionist movements were particularly concerned to reject the putative act of 
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independence.323 Overall, the main stakeholders constructed their legal positions differently: 
While the West uses the idea of human rights sovereignty, Russia resorts to the idea of the 
general will.324 
Following this, Russia embarked on legitimising Crimea’s cause for self-determination, 
which was a difficult task, given that the annexation of Crimea contradicted “(…) everything 
that has been written in Russia over the last twenty years.”325 Nevertheless, Russia embarked 
on this task with full confidence. The general line of Russia’s argumentation, which is later 
repeated on different occasions, is found in the 18 March 2014 address of President Putin in the 
Kremlin. In this speech, among other things, Putin reinstated the respect for the norms of 
international law, made references to the history of Crimea, emphasised the importance of 
Russia’s sovereignty and instrumentalises the Kosovo precedent for Crimea.326 Thus, Putin 
spelled out Russia’s current approach to self-determination putting forward legal and extra 
legal-arguments. Overall, Russia tried to instrumentalise the language of international law to 
justify the annexation of Crimea.  
Nevertheless, whil the state officials embarked on the interpretation of international law 
actively, the legal scholars remained relatively passive.327According to several studies carried 
out on the matter, on the occasion of discussing the subject, Russian legal academics 
overwhelmingly repeated Russia’s official line of reasoning, mainly mirroring the arguments 
used by President Putin. For example, a conference was held after the annexation of Crimea, 
where Russian legal scholars presented their position on self-determination. According to 
Moiseienko, amongst these scholars, Chernichenko invoked the arguments related to Crimea’s 
history.328 Furthermore, other senior scholars invoked the coup in Kiyev, the violations of the 
human rights of ethnic Russians by Ukraine, the history of Crimea, the Kosovo case as grounds 
justifying Crimea’s right to self-determination and argued that the population of Crimea 
constituted a separate “nation”.329  
  Another document produced by Russian experts in international law was an appeal to 
International Law Association, which was headed by the President of the Russian Association 
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of International Law.330 The document, among other things, tried to justify Russia’s annexation 
of Crimea in line with an argumentation narrative found in the official statements. The 
arguments presented in the document resonateed with Russia’s official stance and presented the 
following points to justify the annexation of Crimea: 1) the support of the West for Ukraine’s 
military coup, 2) the dangers arising from Ukraine’s new government, 3) the respect of the 
rights of ethnic Russians as a precondition of political and legal stability, 4) the Kosovo 
Precedent as a ground authorising self-determination for Crimea.331  
 Furthermore, while Moiseenko discusses also several instances, where Russian legal 
scholars of younger generation, such as Davletbaev and Isaeva chose to contradict Russia’s 
official line of reasoning in case of Crimea, he still notes that such critical approach is only 
marginal and does not present the mainstream of the Russian approaches regarding the 
annexation of Crimea.332 Hence, the following section engages in an in-depth discussion of the 
arguments put forward by Russia’s key high-ranking officials from a critical legal point of view, 
simultaneously trying to find analogies with the Soviet approach to self-determination. 
 
3.5. Critical Analysis of Russia’s Arguments on Crimea’s Right to Self-determination 
 
3.5.1. Overview of the Findings  
 
 As discussed previously, the analysis of Russia’s official justification of the annexation 
of Crimea was carried out with the help of QCA method, following the steps outlined by 
Schreier.333 Overall, 51 official documents were analysed, which included both primary and 
secondary sources mainly published on the official website of the President and MFA of the 
RF. The analysis focused on the most relevant speeches and interviews on the justification of 
the Crimea case throughout the whole period of 2014-2020. The statements present the 
arguments of President Putin, Minister of Foreign Affairs Lavrov and several Russia’s 
ambassadors. The general picture of the analysis in line with explanation of the meaning of 
each theme and samples, is presented in a sample coding frame and reflects the dominant 
themes, which were repeated across the statements at least 10 times. The unit of the analysis, 
counted as a frequency, was thematic and included both sentences and paragraphs.334  
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 All in all, the analysis identified that Russia’s justification narratives included both legal 
and non-legal arguments. According to the code frequencies, the dominant themes are as 
follows: 1) Arguments Related to Self-Determination and Secession: Referendum, Ukraine’s 
Violations of Human Rights, Kosovo Precedent, Self-determination; 2) Other Arguments: 
Political Crisis in Ukraine, Crimea after 2014, Blaming the West, Crimea’s History, Protecting 
Compatriots. Interestingly, the identified themes were initially put forward primarily by Putin 
in his 2014 March 18 Address. The analysis indicated that across the statements the themes are 
synchronised with Putin’s justification narratives, without any major deviation. 
 
3.5.2. Arguments Related to Self-Determination and Secession 
 
Self-determination: The analysis of the official statements indicated that for Russia the 
representation of the annexation of Crimea as a case of self-determination was an important but 
difficult task. To illustrate, while referring to the text of the Helsinki Final Act, Russia’s 
ambassador to Switzerland at the time stated: “we cannot but pay attention to the wording that 
“the borders in Europe can be changed in accordance with international law, peacefully and by 
agreement”335 (implying that) the entry of Crimea into Russia was legal. Similarly, Lavrov 
claimed that during the Cold War the two opposing blocs agreed on the principles enshrined in 
the Final Act, emphasising “(…) non- interference in internal affairs, respect for people's right 
to self-determination, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, human rights, 
etc.”336 Furthermore,  another document that is referred to by Russian officials to support 
Crimea’s cause for self-determination is the UN Charter. To illustrate, president Putin insisted 
that the right is authorised by Article 1 of the UN.337 Likewise, Russia’s Ambassador to 
Indonesia at the time argued that the realisation of self-determination by Crimeans was achieved 
per Article 1 of the UN Charter.338 These references imply that Russia did not see any 
contradictions with the annexation of Crimea and the norms of international law. 
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 Nevertheless, even though Russian officials used these documents instrumentally to 
present the case of Crimea in the frames of the right to self-determination, as discussed, these 
documents do not allow secession based on the general will of the people or for national 
minorities. To be specific, it was established that the Helsinki Final Act is a political document, 
which does not confer any legal obligations on states but must be read in the context of the 
principles of the inviolability of frontiers. As for the UN Charter, it did not foresee secession 
for national minorities. Moreover, although in the postcolonial period the discussions on self-
determination continued, still, there is not enough support for secession outside the 
decolonisation context.339 As for Crimea, it has never been considered a non-self-governing 
territory, hence, it falls outside the decolonisation.340  
 Interestingly, only a few statements touched upon the issue of territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of states, revealing interesting aspects of Russia’s understanding of sovereignty in 
the context of Crimea. For example, while talking about the incorporation of Crimea into the 
RF Russia’s Ambassador to Nepal at the time claimed that “two sovereign states took a 
sovereign decision, which concerns two of them and their people.”341 Another striking example 
is Putin’s interpretation of sovereignty. While he stated that he has “never disputed that Ukraine 
is a modern, full-fledged, sovereign, European country,”342 elsewhere he stipulated: “yes, we 
recognise its /Ukraine’s/ sovereignty.(…) Joining any military bloc or any other rigid 
integration alliance amounts to a partial loss of sovereignty. But if a country opts for this 
and wants to cede part of its sovereignty, it’s free to do so. (…) if Ukraine joins, say, NATO, 
NATO’s infrastructure will move directly towards the Russian border, which cannot leave us 
indifferent.”343  
 Thus, with the Crimea case, Russia departed from her previous understanding of 
sovereignty and boldly claimed Russia’s sovereignty to be more important than the sovereignty 
of other countries. As Borgen argues, with the annexation of Crimea for Russia “state 
sovereignty loses its central place.”344 In other words, sovereignty was redefined in a way “(…) 
that aggrandises the scope of Russian sovereignty while minimising sovereignty claims of post-
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Soviet States.345 This is against the principle of territorial integrity of states, which has 
traditionally been prioritised by states.346 
 
Referendum: In an attempt to prove that the unification of Crimea with Russia was legal and 
was conducted in compliance with the norms of international law, Russian officials often argued 
that the unification was the choice of the people of Crimea, reflected in a referendum. For 
example, it was stated  that the reunification of Crimea with Russia took place after the 
Crimeans opted for self-determination in a referendum by an overwhelming majority.347 Also, 
one of the statements asserted that there was no conflict but rather a transparent referendum, 
which took place in peaceful conditions.348 Besides, some statements maintained that the 
referendum was a natural response to the “anti-constitutional coup in Kiev,”349 hence, “holding 
a referendum on self-determination was the only possible way to protect the vital interests of 
the Crimean people in the face of the unacceptable actions of radical nationalists.”350 In other 
words, the incorporation of Crimea into the RF is presented to be a remedy of last resort.351 
Also, the officials stressed the numbers claiming that the high turnout and the choice of the 
people in favor of joining the Russian Federation, compelled Russia to accept Crimea.352 
 In reality, the way the referendum was held in Crimea was criticised widely. 
Specifically, the fact that the events leading to Crimea’s referendum developed in three weeks 
and the date of referendum was changed three times was deemed problematic since the 
preparatory stage was shortened. Moreover, the whole referendum was organised in a manner 
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that pointed to a pre-established result.353 Finally, the reported number of participation is also 
questionable. Hence, one can easily argue that referendum in Ukraine was carried out 
instrumentally to build a convincing argument for Crimea’s secession. 
 Meanwhile, the most important point is that referenda rather fall under domestic law. 
international law does not confer any special status on referenda and its role has not been 
supported by the international community as well unless it is backed by the parent state.354 In 
the case of Crimea, only the Ukrainian Constitution could confer a right to Crimea to decide 
her political future by referendum, hence, the 2014 referendum held in Crimea without 
Ukraine’s authorisation was illegal.355 To be precise, the Ukrainian Constitution does not 
authorise secession by local referendum, what is more, it requires any referendum concerning 
territorial change to be one of all the citizens of the country.356 The same is supported by Article 
1 of the Crimean Constitution, which submits to the power of the Constitution of Ukraine.357 
Thus, the referendum in Crimea was illegal, hence it cannot be used as a valid legal argument 
to justify Crimea’s annexation and incorporation into Russia. As referenda can be utilised 
instrumentally as a veil for territorial expansion, it can be argued that Russia held Crimea’s 
referendum to justify her territorial expansion.358 
 
Ukraine’s violations of human rights: As illustrated, one of the most important themes 
identified in the analysed documents is  “Ukraine's violations of human rights.” According to 
the statements, Russian officials implied that Ukraine’s violations of human rights made the 
situation in Crimea inevitable. For example, it is argued that the decisions of those behind the 
coup were against the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine.359 Special emphasis was made 
on the abolition of the official status of the Russian language, which is overwhelmingly used 
by Crimeans and residents of the eastern and southeastern regions of Ukraine.360 This was seen 
as an attempt to “deprive the Russians of their historical memory (…) to make them an object 
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of forced assimilation.”361 In addition to language and identity, the officials claimed that “ (…) 
the economy, interethnic, interfaith and cultural ties turned out to be undermined.”362  
 Apparently, for the Russian authorities the mistreatment of the Russian minority by the 
Ukrainian authorities made Crimea’s  referendum “absolutely legitimate.”363 Besides, these 
statements constructed Ukraine to be a country, which violates not only the human rights of 
Russians but also all the citizens: “Ukraine has become the undisputed leader in manifestations 
of anti-Semitism and intolerance towards people of Jewish descent (…).364 The accusations of 
antisemitism and neo-nazism were utilised by Putin as well.365 What is more, some statements 
accused Ukraine of violating the rights of its citizens to free expression, and the freedom of 
faith.366  Thus, the aim of the references to the violations of human rights in Ukraine was to 
justify the annexation of Crimea and show that Russia was better at upholding human rights.  
 Nevertheless, a careful analysis of the situation in Ukraine before the annexation in 
Crimea indicates that Russia’s allegations of Ukraine’s violations of human rights were 
exaggerated. While there is no denying that there have been human rights violations in Ukraine, 
specifically against the Tatar minority, however, these violations were not grave and 
systemic.367 The same conclusion was reached by the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR) following a visit to Ukraine in 2014 before the annexation of 
Crimea.368 Moreover, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, ethnic Russian were not 
subjected to assimilation. For example, before 2014 there were about 500 Russian schools and 
less than 10 Ukrainian in Crimea. Moreover, the Russian language has been largely used in 
Ukraine as a second language even in state institutions and in practice, people were able to 
choose which language to speak.369 Furthermore, this theme is interesting in light of the grim 
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human rights situation in Russia, which has been well documented throughout the last 
decades.370 This makes Russia’s concerns about Ukraine’s violations of human rights 
hypocritical. What is more, there is clear evidence of human rights violations by Russia in 
Crimea as well. Specifically, following the annexation of Crimea, among other things, 
repressive measures were introduced to silence the political opposition. Hence, Russia’s 
concern with violations of human rights in Ukraine is hypocritical and is only there to serve the 
country’s foreign policy interests.   
 Finally, the human rights violations theme is strongly linked to the remedial secession 
theory. In other words, Russia tried to justify the annexation by the elements of remedial 
secession. Nevertheless, as it has been indicated, the doctrine of remedial secession is contested 
both in theory and practice.371 Nevertheless, even if Ukraine had violated the human rights of 
Crimeans, and if secession is possible, from the point of remedial secession theory, secession 
would be understood only as a remedy of last resort, which realises only after all efforts are 
proven fruitless. Remedial secession entails gradual procedure and not a measure available in 
the initial stage of a crisis.372 Thus, first of all, efforts must be taken to resolve the crisis “(…) 
within the existing legal order.”373 Nevertheless, in the case of Crimea, no efforts were made to 
resolve the crisis in a good faith Crimea. Moreover, no negotiation preceded the separation and 
annexation of Crimea. In other words: “even if a problem had existed in Crimea of a type 
justifying remedial secession, the situation was not ripe for secession in March 2014.”374 Thus, 
the argument that the human rights violations of Ukraine justify the annexation of Crimea is 
legally weak and points to Russia’s hypocrisy, self-interest and double-standards in the 
annexation of Crimea. 
 
The Kosovo precedent: To continue, it was indicated that when Kosovo declared independence 
Russia showed strong opposition, claiming that the Kosovo case would open up the pandora 
box. Nevertheless, Russia went on instrumentalising the Kosovo case for her interests.375  For 
example, it was claimed that it is the Western states that used “sui generis” types of arguments 
thus undermining the norms of international law.376 The officials argued that the ICJ Advisory 
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opinion on Kosovo found that there was no violation of international law when the region was 
separated from its state.377 What is more, stress was made on the fact that in Kosovo, unlike in 
Crimea, there was no referendum for independence as the decision was made by the parliament. 
This was to insist that Crimea’s referendum exemplified a more democratic approach 
to determining one’s future.378  
 In fact, the Kosovo case has been controversial and there is extensive literature available 
on the legal issue of the Kosovo case. Nevertheless, in this context, the most important point is 
that having opposed to recognise Kosovo’s independence and having blamed the Western states 
for opening the pandora box of secessionist movements, Russia instrumentalised the same 
argument to justify the annexation of Crimea, in a way contradicting her previous words and 
actions. Concerning the Kosovo case, Russia refused to acknowledge the possibility of a 
remedial right to secession in modern international law, except in “truly extreme circumstances, 
such as an outright armed attack by the parent State, threatening the very existence of the people 
in question.”379 Moreover, the grounds of comparison of the cases of Kosovo and Crimea are 
very weak. The validity of the Kosovo/Crimea parallel has been thoroughly discussed and 
contested in the field of international law.380 Most importantly, the ICJ Advisory Opinion on 
Kosovo did not state that secession is not a violation of international law, it rather stated that 
the act of the proclamation of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence was not in violation 
of the norms of international law, which is clearly different.381 Thus, here also one can see the 
double standards; while Russia refused to accept that there was a humanitarian crisis in the case 
of Kosovo, it did implement this line of argumentation in the case of Crimea.382 
 Nevertheless, the main take is that Russia tried to justify the Crimea case in the language 
of international law. This indicates that Russia wanted to present herself as an entity, which 
respected the norms of international law. For example, Russian officials insisted that 
“international law should be mandatory for all and should not be applied selectively to serve 
the interests of individual select countries or groups of states, and most importantly, it should 
be interpreted consistently.”383 Nevertheless, Russia’s respect for international law came hand 
in hand with self-interests. For example, Lavrov highlighted that they continued “(…) to work 
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in compliance with our obligations on international issues, including the Conceptual Policy of 
the Russian Federation.”384 He also stated that compliance with the fundamental norms of 
international law lied at the core of the Russian foreign policy philosophy.385  As Borgen states: 
“international law is the vocabulary of modern diplomacy (…) International law defines the 
common terms of discourse (…) international law sets the rules for which words make sense 
when used together and which do not. (…).”386 Hence, Russia’s use of international legal 
arguments is strategic and serves her self-interests.  
 
3.5.3. Other Arguments 
 
Political crisis in Ukraine, Blaming the West, Protecting Compatriots: Amongst the recurring 
narratives attempting to justify the annexation of Crimea a wide part was devoted to the political 
crisis in Ukraine. Specifically, the crisis was portrayed as a direct threat to the Russian speaking 
population of Ukraine in general and Crimea in particular. Moreover, Russian officials saw the 
crisis as a major security threat to Russia’s foreign policy interests. Accusations were made to 
the authorities of Ukraine for using force against the peaceful population and violating the rights 
of the Russian speaking minority. The recurring line in these arguments is that Russia did not 
attack Ukraine, or use force but in light of Ukraine’s political crisis there was no alternative but 
to act and protect the compatriots.  
 To be specific, it was stated that  from the very beginning of the crisis “ (…) the Right 
Sector made attempts to break through and seize administrative buildings.”387 What is more, 
the new authorities of Ukraine were accused of violating the basic rights of Russians.388 These 
events were portrayed to be legitimising Crimea’s declaration of independence and the 
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incorporation into the RF.389 The main argument was that in light of the “changing political 
situation, which threatened the violation of the rights and freedoms of people”390 the people of 
Crimea had no alternative to secession. What is more, in an attempt to portray Russia as a peace-
loving country, it was parallelly argued that the reunification of Crimea was done peacefully, 
without any human losses and violence.391 For example, Zakharova argued that upon the 
unification with Russia  “Crimea did not fall prey to national radicals.”392  
 Unsurprisingly, the arguments referring to the political crisis in Ukraine came hand in 
hand with arguments blaming the West for inciting anti-Russian sentiments in Ukraine and 
interfering in Russia’s so-called sphere of influence. In particular, the attempt of the EU to sign 
an Association Agreement with Ukraine was deemed unacceptable for Russia.393 Moreover, 
Russia hesitated to see the political crisis as a reflection of clashing civil positions but rather a 
fabrication of the West to destabilise the region.394 Apart from the EU, the US was also accused 
of supporting “(…) the unconstitutional coup d'etat in Ukraine.”395 What is more, in the eyes of 
the Russian officials by supporting the activities in Maidan the Western countries “(…) 
discredit(ed) themselves as adherents of the rule of law.”396  
 In light of the political crisis in Ukraine and the Western support, Russia constructed 
itself as a defender of the compatriots abroad aiming to protect the so-called legitimate interests 
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of ethnic Russians and the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine.397 Hence, Russia pleaded 
to use “(…) the entire range of available means – from political and economic to operations 
under international humanitarian law and the right of self-defense.”398 This was reinstated by 
Lavrov, who claimed that Russia would defend the interests of its citizens by “political, 
diplomatic, legal methods.399  
 Nevertheless, from the perspective of international law, the political crisis in Ukraine 
did not authorise Russia to interfere in the affairs of the country or annex its territories. A few 
points must be clarified here. The prohibition against the use of force is not absolute in 
international law and according to Article 51 of the UN Charter, is allowed  for self-defense if 
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.400 Nevertheless, “(…) the 
prohibition against acquisition of territory by threat or use of force (…) is not subject to 
qualification.”401 This has been reflected in the 1974 UNGA Definition of Aggression, which 
states that “no territorial acquisition or special advantage resulting from aggression is or shall 
be recognised as lawful.”402 Hence, international law gives specific importance to defined 
boundaries. This, in its turn, makes Russia’s claimed justifications for use of force and 
annexation of Crimea void: “justifications for an armed intervention, even if accepted, are not 
justifications for the forcible acquisition of territory.”403 Thus, Russia’s arguments related to 
the political crisis in Ukraine do not justify the annexation of Crimea. 
 Besides, the view that Crimea was threatened by the political crisis in Ukraine was only 
supported by Russia and not other states.404 Nevertheless, Russia tried to argue the legality 
based on the invitation of Yanukovich. It is correct that a state may invite another state for 
assistance, however, the consent must be clear. The protective intervention has been criticised 
by the international community in several cases such as the US intervention in Grenada and the 
strikes in Yemen, Pakistan. As for Crimea, the validity of Yanukovych’s invitation was 
contested as generally it was not accepted “(…) that Yanukovych remained head of state, and 
the central government of Ukraine largely continued to function.”405 Thus, these events, which 
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lead the rule of Yanukovich to an end, did not create a basis for foreign intervention and had to 
be dealt with under Ukrainian constitutional law.406  
 Finally, the fact that an extensive part of the arguments was devoted to accusations of 
the Western actions in Ukraine indicated that Russia’s real motives in the case of Crimea 
reflected Russia’s geopolitical and foreign policy thinking. Specifically, as it was indicated, the 
concept of the protection of compatriots and the so-called sphere of influence make up a part 
of Russia’s foreign policy ideas.407  Hence, Russia perceived the Post-Soviet countries to be 
under her sphere of influence and did not tolerate any move from the West towards these 
territories. Thus, Russia perceived revolutions in this space “(…) as West’s attempts to 
undermine Moscow’s role and status in Eurasia and insists on Russia being treated as an equal 
partner in relations with the United States and the European Union.”408 Thus, in the background 
of the annexation of Crimea, one must carefully examine Russia’s anxieties related to the 
expansion of NATO and the EU into eastern Europe: “Russia’s leadership apparently thought 
that a self-determination dispute could slow Ukraine’s integration into Western international 
institutions.”409 
 
Revising history and Crimea after 2014: In the legitimisation narratives, one of the most 
interesting themes of arguments was the revision of history. In other words, most of the 
documents discussing the Crimea case, saw it as righting the historical wrongs, claiming that 
“in 2014 historical justice triumphed,”410 this is because “Khrushchev’s history mistakes and 
voluntarism were corrected without a single shot or sacrifice.”411 Some officials even went as 
far as the 19th century to argue that Crimea has always been Russian.412 They claimed that 
“Crimea was Ukrainian only the last 60 years”413 and many forgot “(…) the fact that before this 
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centuries-old history of Crimea was connected with Russia.”414 Thus, it was argued that the 
Soviets violated the historical justice “(…) when Crimea and Sevastopol were illegally - even 
by Soviet laws - torn away from the Russian Federation, from the RSFSR.”415 For Russia the 
injustice continued after the collapse of the Soviet Union when “Crimea was cut off from Russia 
“alive.”416 It is interesting that the officials did not present extensive arguments regarding the 
issue of the “people” in self-determination, which is understandable, given the complexities 
thet the defiition of self-determination has been subjected in interntional law. Nevertheless, it 
can be claimed that alongside the historical claims Russia constructs the people of Crimea as a 
separate unit for self-determination, whch is again departure from her previous approach. 
 Nevertheless, to argue that the reunification of Crimea was the right decision the 
officials claimed that Crimea’s situation had improved after incorporation into Russia. 
Specifically, it was argued that Crimeans “fully trust the Russian state”417 and that “living with 
Russia is better than with Ukraine.418 Furthermore, it was stressed that Crimea's economic 
situation had also improved significantly and “there has been an increase in the welfare of 
Crimeans.419 Of course, this was attributed to the Russian authorities and specifically president 
Putin. Finally, it was argued that the situation of human rights has also drastically improved in 
Crime after joining Russia.420 To back this argument, it was contended that “Ukrainian and 
Crimean Tatar languages are officially declared state languages in Crimea.421 
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 When it comes to the historical arguments, they are problematic given the risks of the 
clash between subjective and instrumentalised interpretations of the situation by different 
actors.422 If history were valid then Russia should have been reminded of the fact that “Russian 
Empire conquered Crimea from the Ottoman Empire or that the Tatar Khanate had a longer 
history in Crimea than Russia.” 423 Nevertheless, while this theme does not express legal 
argumentation, it reveals Russia’s foreign policy thinking offering an understanding of Russia’s 
situational reinterpretation of history for legal ends. 
 
3.6. From the 1966 Soviet Approach to Self-determination to Russia’s Approach to Self-
determination in Crimea 
 
 While, the previous parts of the analysis established the characteristics of the Soviet and 
Russian use of self-determination, two points still need to be reassembled based on previous 
discussions. First, it is important to clearly state the way the Soviet and Russian approaches to 
self-determination differed from the Western approach and second, establish the links between 
the current Russian and Soviet understanding and application of the right of self-determination 
to verify the hypothesis. 
 As discussed, the Bolshevik and the Wilosinian understanding of self-determination 
differed from each other as the former was based on socialism and the latter was based on liberal-
democratic thought. Moreover, while Lenin utilised self-determination as a revolutionary 
principle against the European empires, Wilson hoped that self-determination would become a 
tool against revolutionary challenges to existing orders. The Bolsheviks criticised the Western 
states for imperialism and exploiting other countries, but they were hypocritical while using 
self-determination as it was meant to further advance their ideological and political agenda 
despite the propagation of the idea that Lenin aimed to liberate oppressed people. When it 
comes to the question of hypocrisy, one thing must be noted. While the Wilsonian idea of self-
determination was popular, it remained a political concept and was not included in the Covenant 
of the League of Nations. Hence, at the time it did not develop into a general norm of 
international law. This was also reflected in the outcome of the Aaland Islands dispute.424 Thus, 
at the stage, the West straightforwardly refused to accept the possibility of secession for national 
minorities based on self-determination. Hence, the West displayed less hypocrisy. 
 In contrast, the Soviets were the first to include the principle in bilateral international 
treaties, which are referred to as the 1920-1921 Soviet Peace treaties. Nevertheless, in practice, 
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they did not easily grant secession based on self-determination. This was reflected in the 
practice of the Soviet peace treaties vis a vis the Baltic states and Georgia, which was about 
restoring the borders of the Russian Empire. Thus, unlike the Western states the Soviets 
pioneered the possibility of secession for national minorities based on self-determination but in 
practice tried to restore the territories of the Russian empire. Thus, their hypocrisy lied in the 
gap between theory and practice. The same line of thinking continued during the decolonisation 
period, when the Soviets considered that the issue of self-determination was resolved in their 
territories,  nevertheless, in reality from the Western liberal perspective, there was no actual 
self-determination in the Soviet Union. Hence, at the time, the USSR promoted self-
determination as a foreign policy tool. They refused any criticism and prioritised the principle 
of state sovereignty and territorial integrity and thought of self-determination to apply to other 
countries only.425  
  Meanwhile, in the decolonisation period many major Western countries refused to 
accept the posssibility of secession, given their colonial interests.426 The Soviets promoted the 
inclusion of a clause on self-determination in the ICCPR and ICESCR, for colonial peoples. At 
the times many Western countries opposed this, which reflected their colonial interests, 
however, they eventually accepted it. The fact that the decolonisation period was accompanied 
by the Salt Water thesis, which favoured the Soviets, indicated the existence of double-
standards reinforced by the Soviets.427 Thus, the hypocrisy of the Soviets was reflected in the 
fact that while they constantly denied the existence of self-determination issues internally, they 
started actively promoting it for the other countries. This was part of their anti-Western foreign 
policy agenda. In contrast, the fact that the Western countries explicitly opposed it, seemed at 
least honest. 
  The main argument is that while the Western states were also hypocritical as they 
prioritised their self-interests, but unlike Russia, they did not propose such legal standards that 
they would not be able to uphold. This was also visible in the latest developments on self-
determination from the reluctance of some major Western states to vote for the 2007 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. While this was a non-binding instrument, 
these states straightforwardly manifested their position by voting against it. Hence, one may 
argue that the main difference between the Soviet and Western approach in the given situation 
was that the Soviets categorically refused to acknowledge the presence of issues related to self-
determination within its territories and started promoting the right internationally. In contrast, 
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the Western countries, acknowledging their self-interests and issues related to colonialism and 
imperialism, were more cautious and did not propose to promote standards that they were not 
ready to uphold to themselves. Thus, ths Soviet approach to self-determination differed from 
the Western one first by underlying ideoloogy and also by the application, which entailed 
double-stadards and hypocricy. 
 To continue, when it comes to Russia and its relation to the Soviet understanding of 
self-determination, the analysis established the legal links between these two entities, based on 
Russia’s proposed doctrine of state continuity. The transition from the Soviet Union had serious 
consequences for the understanding of the right of peoples to self-determination, which justified 
the attempt to draw parallels between the Soviet and later Russian understanding of the right. 
Thus, Russia, just like the Soviet Union thought of the issue of self-determination to be resolved 
within the frames of federalism, however, the situation in Chechnya and Tatarstan for example, 
proved the opposite to be true. Nevertheless, throughout the 1991-2013 period, Russia strongly 
opposed the interpretation of self-determination outside the colonial context. Russia’s approach 
was shaped by its domestic situation and foreign policy goals. However, following Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence, Russia started gradually seeing the possibility of secession outside 
the decolonisation context. Hence, one may argue that Russia’s current understanding of self-
determination is unique and more similar to the Soviet understanding rather than the Western 
liberal-democratic understanding of self-determination. The fact that just like the Soviets, 
Russia percieved the issue of self-determination to be resolved in its territory, gave Russia the 
confidence to criticise the Western actions in Kosovo and later argue for Crimea’s right to self-
determination. Based on the above discussion, the study concludes that at its core Russia’s 
current approach to the right of peoples to self-determination is rooted in the Soviet approach 
rather than the Western, liberal-democratic approach.428 
 As for the resonation between the Soviet and Russian approaches to self-determination, 
several patterns were identified. To start with, the way Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and tried 
to justify it, reminded of a few episodes from the Soviet past, which was discussed earlier.429 
For example, it was identified that the Soviets did not genuinely care about the aspirations of 
peoples for self-determination and instrumentalised self-determination for the goals of 
socialism. Eventually, the Bolshevik and later the Soviet practice of self-determination was 
anti-Western and was used for restoring the borders of the Russian empire. Similarly, in the 
case of Crimea, Russia did not necessarily care about the will of the people of Crimea but rather 
used self-determination for territorial expansion, which also reflected Russia’s anti-Western 
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foreign policy goals and anxieties related to the expansion of the EU and NATO. This indicated 
that Russia, just like the Soviets, was after her self-interests. Most importantly, in both 
situations, they tried to explain their respective actions with the language of international law.  
 Furthermore, as discussed, the Soviet application of self-determination was 
characterised by double-standards as they refused to acknowledge the existence of self-
determination issues in their territories. This gave the Soviets the confidence to promote self-
determination in the decolonisation context for other countries. Arguably in a similar way, in 
the case of Crimea Russia resorted to double-standards by contending that the issue of self-
determination was resolved in Russia and it is Ukraine that had issues with self-determination 
and not Russia. Most likely Russia would not show the same confidence if Chechnya and 
Tatarstan reactivated their secessionist aspirations. What is more, another indicator of Russia’s 
hypocrisy regarding the subject was that with the annexation of Crimea, having exaggerated 
the human rights violations in Ukraine, Russia refused to acknowledge the grave situation of 
human rights in Russia as, despite their official narrative, among other things, they mistreated 
the minorities of Crimea.  
 Moreover, if the human rights violations were Russia’s main concerns, from the very 
beginning they should have acknowledged the humanitarian situation in Kosovo. In this case, 
the double-standards were reflected in the fact that while the Kosovo case was closer to the 
standards of remedial secession theory, they refused to acknowledge its validity for Kosovo.  
Nevertheless, they used arguments of remedial secession in the case of Crimea, where it was 
clear that the case was far from meeting the criteria outlined by the remedial secession scheme. 
In other words, Russia distorted the real value of remedial secession by using it for a case, 
which did not qualify for it. As for Russia’s criticism of the Western application of the right, at 
least the West tried to use the language of remedial secession for a situation that objectively 
qualified as one. Whether or not the theory is supported in international law is a matter of 
different discussions.  
 Furthermore, it was indicated that Russia tried to justify her otherwise illegal acts in 
Ukraine with the language of international law. For example, while intervening in Ukraine 
Russia invoked the invitation of Yanukovich as a legal ground for intervention, which was not 
accepted by the international community. Besides, an illegal referendum was staged to justify 
Crimea’s right to self-determination and to deny the existence of the conflict. Most importantly, 
Ukraine’s authorities were accused of antisemitism and neo-nazism, thus trying to portray 
Russia as a liberator of Crimea. In the same style, following the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the 
Soviet authorities fabricated an official narrative, according to which they had liberated these 
states from fascism. A specific role was given to the line of the narrative of a popular 
65 
 
revolution.430 In defense of their actions, the Soviets pointed towards the 21 July 1940 
pronouncements issued by the legislators of the Baltic states, which approved the incorporation, 
remaining  silent about the fact that this was based on “mock-elections conducted in violation 
of the constitutions of the Baltic States.”431 Most importantly, the Soviets   refused to admit that 
in 1940 the Baltics states acceded the Soviet Union under the pressure of the Soviet ultimatum 
of “approval or annihilation.”432 In the same style, the Soviets later intervened in 
Czechoslovakia, and as a justification, produced an unsigned document implying that Czech 
leaders “invited” the Warsaw Pact forces to enter Czechoslovakia.”433 In all the discussed cases 
coercion was made against the territorial integrity and political independence of these states. 
 Altogether, in all discussed instances, the Soviet Union and Russia respectively were 
not concerned with the realisation of self-determination of peoples but rather used the language 
of international law to advance their anti-Western, expansionist foreign policy agenda. 
Furthermore, both entities applied double-standards as they arguably thought of self-
determination to apply to others only and refused to be subjected to criticism. Also, they tried 
to present themselves as proponents of international law by proposing to help others to realise 
their right to self-determination by relying on the norms of international law. Nevertheless, their 
practice resurfaced their hypocrisy as it was about the use of force and subversion of power, 
rather than genuine concern for the right of respective groups to self-determination.  
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 CONCLUSION 
 
 Overall, the study aimed at establishing the links between the Russian approach to the 
right of peoples to self-determination in the case of Crimea and that of the 1966 Soviet approach 
as reflected in the discussions around the UN Covenants. In particular, the study hypothesised 
that the current Russian approach to the right of peoples to self-determination resembles the 
Soviet approach in its legal flexibility characterised by self-interest, hypocrisy, and double-
standards. To verify the hypothesis, the study laid down two interconnected research questions. 
The first research question aimed at establishing the characteristics of the Soviet approach to 
the right of peoples to self-determination in the 1960s and that of Russia following the 
annexation of Crimea. The second research question aimed at identifying the links between the 
Soviet approach to the right of peoples to self-determination in 1966 and that of Russia 
following the annexation of Crimea in 2014. In line with some interesting findings, the study 
reached several important conclusions. 
 To start with, when it comes to the characteristics of the Soviet approach to the right of 
peoples to self-determination, it was identified that the Bolshevik understanding of self-
determination was somehow unique as it differed from the Western, liberal-democratic notion 
of self-determination in several ways. Primarily, in contrast to the Western liberal-democratic 
understanding of the right, the Bolshevik and later Soviet understanding was based on the 
political philosophy of socialism, as the end goal was not the independence of those nations but 
their integration in a socialist world. Overall, the Bolshevik understanding of self-determination 
had strong propaganda and tactical elements and in practice was used for restoring the territories 
of the Russian Empire. Furthermore, the study also established that from the very beginning, 
the Soviet practice of self-determination was based on hypocrisy and double-standards. This 
was displayed through the analysis of the Soviet application of the right of peoples to self-
determination in the 1920 Soviet Peace treaties. As illustrated, following the conclusion of the 
peace treaties, the Bolsheviks annexed Georgia in February 1921, and eventually took over 
Estonia in 1939, despite having explicitly recognised the right of these peoples to self-
determination/secession in the discussed treaties. Hence, their practice of self-determination 
revealed the underlying hypocrisy and the aim to restore the borders of the Russian Empire. 
 Furthermore, the thesis identified that this flexibility continued in the decolonisation 
period as well: in addition to hypocrisy and double-standards, the Soviets also displayed self-
interests concerning the use of the right of peoples to self-determination. The highlight of this 
process was the inclusion of an article on the right of peoples to self-determination in the 1966 
UN Covenants with the initiative of the Soviet Union. The Soviet move to include the right of 
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peoples to self-determination in the 1966 Covenants was hypocritical and pointed double-
standards and self-interests as while they criticised the Western European powers for their 
colonial and imperial legacy, they did not accept any similar criticism directed towards the 
Soviet Union. Meanwhile, while the Soviets believed that they had fulfilled the self-
determination aspirations of their nations within their territories, in the Western liberal sense, 
none of the peoples in the USSR had internal self-determination but the Soviets refused to 
acknowledge it. In other words, the Soviet Union had itself turned into an empire, despite the 
ideas and ideals of its forefathers. Hence, upon the end of the decolonisation period, the Soviets 
used different standards at home and abroad and their understanding of self-determination was 
characterised by legal flexibility reflected in the adhered double-standards, hypocrisy and self-
interest, which were used as tools to further advance the anti-Western foreign policy goals.   
To continue, another important point established by the study was the link between the 
legal thinking of the Soviet Union and contemporary Russia, which was also reflected in 
Russia’s current understanding of the right of peoples to self-determination. To be specific, it 
was established that upon the transition from the USSR to the RF, Russia invoked the doctrine 
of state continuity, thus pledging to maintain its legal ties with the Soviet Union. Although later 
Russia declared the precedence of Russian law over that of the USSR and went on a capitalist 
path, the Soviet past followed Russia long after. This impacted the development of the 
understanding of self-determination as well, since Russia borrowed the flexible approach 
primarily from the Soviet Union, without questioning its foundations. In particular, Russia, just 
like the Soviets, believed that the issue of self-determination was resolved within its territories. 
Hence, one may argue that if and when Russia’s approach to the right of peoples to self-
determination becomes flexible, it is more reasonable to compare it to the Soviet approach first. 
Furthermore, the study illustrated that the main inconsistencies in Russia’s current 
approach to the right of peoples to self-determination were the shift from supporting the 
territorial integrity of states and opposing the recognition of secession outside the 
decolonisation context throughout the 1991-2013 period, to arguing for the limited possibility 
of secession based on the right of peoples to self-determination in 2014. Nevertheless, it was 
also demonstrated that this change did not happen overnight but rather reflected Russia’s 
reaction to several domestic, foreign policy and geopolitical factors. What is more, the study 
revealed the characteristics of Russia’s understanding of self-determination in the case of 
Crimea by critically analysing Russia’s justification arguments found in a number of official 
statements. It was established that Russia utilised the language of international law to justify 
the 2014 annexation of Crimea. The narratives included both legal and non-legal arguments. 
The dominant themes related to self-determination and secession were as follows:  Referendum, 
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Ukraine’s Violations of Human Rights, Kosovo Precedent, Self-determination. In addition to 
this, other types of arguments were also identified such as Political Crisis in Ukraine, Crimea 
after 2014, Blaming the West, Crimea’s History, Protecting Compatriots.   
 To be specific, the study established that Russia’s attempt to present the annexation of 
Crimea as a case of self-determination was not easy as its legal foundations were flawed. In 
particular, while references were made to international legal documents to justify the legality 
of Crimea's cause for self-determination, in reality, none of their arguments justified the right 
of self-determination of Crimea. Furthermore, another characteristic of Russia's justification 
strategy in the case of Crimea was the redefinition of the idea of sovereignty as Russia placed 
her sovereignty above the other states, thus challenging the very idea of territorial integrity of 
states. Besides, Russia's justification narrative included references to Crimea's 2014 
referendum. Nevertheless, the critical analysis indicated that the way the referendum was held 
was in itself problematic, most importantly, it was stated that referenda are a matter of domestic 
law and as in this case, it was not authorised by Ukraine and was illegal, it could not be used as 
a valid legal argument to justify Crimea’s annexation and incorporation into Russia. 
 To continue, another important theme of Russia's arguments was “Ukraine's violations 
of human rights.” According to the statements, Ukraine’s mistreatment of the Russian minority 
made the situation in Crimea inevitable. Nevertheless, a careful analysis of the situation in 
Ukraine before the annexation of Crimea indicated that Russia’s allegations of Ukraine’s 
violations of human rights were exaggerated and revealed Russia’s hypocrisy, given Russia’s 
grave human rights records. Moreover, it was argued that the doctrine of remedial secession 
also could not be invoked in this case, as the Crimea case did not meet the relevant criteria. This 
theme, in line with the references to the Kosovo precedent, revealed Russia’s double-standards 
as in the Kosovo case, Russia refused to acknowledge the possibility of a remedial right to 
secession, even though the Kosovo case was more fit for it than Crimea.  
 Furthermore, amongst the recurring narratives, a wide part was devoted to the political 
crisis in Ukraine. In particular, the crisis was portrayed as a direct threat to the Russian speaking 
population of Ukraine, particularly in Crimea. Unsurprisingly, the arguments referring to the 
political crisis in Ukraine were coupled with arguments condemning the West for interfering in 
Russia’s sphere of influence. In light of the political crisis in Ukraine and the Western support, 
Russia took the role of a defender of the compatriots abroad. Nevertheless, it was established 
that for international law, these arguments were not legally justified. Moreover, it was revealed 
that amongst the non-legal narratives used by Russia the most significant one was the revision 
of history. In other words, most of the documents discussing the Crimea case constructed 
Crimea as a historical part of Russia, which was unfairly gifted to Ukraine. To argue that the 
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reunification of Crimea was the right decision, the officials claimed that Crimea’s situation had 
improved after incorporation into Russia. However, the study established that in this case 
historical arguments were not legally valid as they provided subjective and instrumentalised 
interpretations of the situation.  
 In the following parts, which focused on linking the dots between the Soviet and Russian 
approaches to the right, the study argued that the Soviet and later Russian approaches to the 
right of peoples to self-determination differed from the Western approach by the degree of 
hypocrisy of respective actors. A few arguments were put forward in support of this point. For 
example, it was stated that at the initial stage of the development of self-determination, the West 
straightforwardly refused to accept the possibility of secession for national minorities based on 
self-determination and the principle was not included in the Covenant of the League of Nationa. 
In contrast, the Soviets were the first to include the principle in bilateral international treaties, 
nevertheless, in practice, they did not easily grant secession based on self-determination. In 
practice they tried to restore the territories of the Russian empire. A similar argument was made 
concerning the decolonisation period. Particularly, it was indicated that at the time, the Soviets 
considered that the issue of self-determination was resolved in their territories as, allegedly, 
nations had fulfilled their right to self-determination aspirations with autonomic units in a 
federal structure. Nevertheless, there was no actual liberal self-determination in the Soviet 
Union. Hence, at the time, the USSR promoted self-determination, relying on double-standards 
and hypocrisy.  
 In the discussed situations the greater degree of the hypocrisy of the Soviets was found 
in the lack of self-reflection and was part of their anti-Western foreign policy agenda. In 
contrast, the fact that the Western countries explicitly opposed it, seemed at least honest. In 
other words, while the Western states also had their self-interests, they explicitly displayed their 
position. This was also later visible from the reluctance of some major Western states to vote 
for the 2007 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. While this was a non-binding 
instrument, these states straightforwardly manifested their position by voting against it. 
Meanwhile, Russia, just like the Soviet Union, continued the line of thinking that the issue of 
self-determination was expressed in the territories of the RF.  
 In addition, the final part of the study established both general and more specific lines 
of resemblance between the 1966 Soviet understanding of self-determination and that of Russia 
in the case of Crime. In particular, it was revealed that neither the Soviet Union nor Russian 
genuinely cared about the struggle of peoples for self-determination in the discusses cases. They 
both instrumentalised self-determination for territorial expansion and also utilised it as a foreign 
policy tool for their anti-Western agenda. Nevertheless, they still resorted to the language of 
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international law in an attempt to justify their actions. For example, the history of the Soviet 
Union and Russia revealed similar tactics of instrumentalisation of self-determination for their 
political ends. For example, by claiming that the incorporatoin of Crimea into the RF was based 
on the popular will of Crimea’s people as reflected in a referendum and by constructing itself 
as a defender of the people of Crimea, Russia reminded of the times when the Soviets used 
similar narrative upon the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. Here also, the official 
line of reasoning emphasised on the narrative of a popular revolution, elections and constructed 
the Soviets as defenders of Estonians. Nevertheless, in both situations, they remained silent 
about the violations of the norms of international law.  
 Overall, based on what was outlined above, it can be concluded that the current Russian 
approach to the right of peoples to self-determination resembles the Soviet approach in its legal 
flexibility characterised by self-interest, hypocrisy, and double-standards. For Russia, just like 
for the Soviet Union, the main point of departure was the perception of one's greatness, power, 
and sovereignty over that of other states. In other words, self-determination was applied 
instrumentally and was understood differently from the Western liberal understanding of the 
right. It was not used to advance the cause of the groups struggling for self-determination but 
rather as a legal cover for otherwise illegal actions. Nevertheless, to say that the Russian 
approach to self-determination in the case of Crimea resemles the Soviet approach of 1966 does 
not necessarily mean that Russia’s approach constitutes a separate and unique approach to self-
determination. The study remains rather cautious regarding this question whether with the 
annexation of Crimea Russia, just like the Soviet Union claimed the existence of a unique anti-
Western approach to international law or not. It can be argued that such statements can be 
proven only after significant amount of time passes since the annexation of Crimea. Arguably, 
six years is not a long enough time to make such judgments boldly. Nevertheless, the study 
claims that with the annexation of Crimea and even before that Russia started heading towards 
a direction, which poses significant challenges to the universality of the international law,  
nevertheless, remaining mindful of Russia’s criticism of the Western support of the 
independence of Kosovo.   
 This is an important observation, which pinpoints the importance of the historical 
perspective in legal studies in general and in the analysis of the right of self-determination in 
particular. To be specific, Russia’s annexation of Crimea was deemed shocking by many. 
Indeed, the annexation of Crimea was against Russia’s otherwise consistent approach to the 
right of peoples to self-determination. Nevertheless, if one looked at history more closely, as 
this study did, Russia’s actions would not come as shocking as the annexation was, after all,  
the result of several factors that were deeply rooted in Russia’s past. In this case, the roots of 
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Russia’s current understanding of self-determination reached as far as the times of the 
Bolsheviks.  
 Finally, the results affirm the notion that it is not enough to compare the modern Russian 
understanding of key international legal issues to that of the Western approach as the historical 
perspective deriving from the cross-analysis of the Soviet approach revealed nuances, which 
are otherwise missing. Thus, the study argues that without a proper historical-legal analysis the 
understanding of key international legal categories in Russia will most likely remain 
incomplete. While a counter-argument can be made that this approach may undermine the 
universality of international law, one must admit that from the very beginning the Soviet 
understanding of international law had little in common with the Western understanding, which 
lies at the core of the contemporary universal understanding of self-determination. This was 
consequential for the Russian legal thinking as well. Hence, this study calls for renewing the 
discussions on the influence of the Soviet international legal thinking on that of contemporary 
Russia. This is vital given that the issue of self-determination movements and secessionist 
claims to independence will not diminish any time soon, neither will Russia’s role in these 
movements.  
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
FRD                The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly         
  Relations         and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter 
  of the United Nations 
HRC                The UN Committee on Human Rights  
ICCPR            The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICESCR          International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
QCA                Qualitative Content Analysis 
RF                   Russian Federation 
SSR                 Soviet Socialist Republic 
UNGA             United Nations General Assembly 
UNSC              United Nations Security Council 
UN                   United Nations 
USSR               Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
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ANNEXES 
Annex 1. Coding Frame 
 
 Code label Description Sample Fr․
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Self-
determination 
Arguments referring to the 
Right of peoples to self-
determination 
No one can prevent these people from 
exercising a right that is stipulated 
in Article 1 of the UN Charter, the right 
of nations to self-determination.435  
32 
Referendum Arguments referring to the 
2014 referendum held in 
Crimea 
Then, referendums on Crimea’s 
independence and then on incorporation 
into Russia were held.436  
52 
Ukraine’s 
Violations of  
Human Rights 
Arguments of Ukraine’s 
violations of 
Human rights 
Out of 2.2 million inhabitants of the 
peninsula, almost 1.5 million are Russian-
speaking, and they tried to de facto ban 
the Russian language after the events on 
the Maidan.437 
43 
Kosovo 
Precedent 
Arguments invoking the 
Kosovo 
precedent 
As is known, in the case of Kosovo, the 
UN International Court of Justice in its 
verdict in July 2010 found that there was 
no violation of international law when the 
region was separated from its state.438 
29 
     
O
T
H
E
R
 
Political Crisis 
in Ukraine 
Arguments constructing the 
political crisis in Ukraine as a 
threat 
What happened in Crimea? First, there 
was this anti-state overthrow in Kiev. 
Whatever anyone may say, I find this 
obvious – there was an armed seizure 
of power(…)The people of Crimea feared 
for their and their children’s future 
following a coup d’etat.439 
71 
Blaming the 
West 
Arguments blaming the West 
for inciting political crisis in 
Ukraine and stepping in 
Russia’s sphere of influence  
The question is not to appropriate a part 
of another country. The background to the 
issue is that the West supported the coup 
against President Yanukovych, elected by 
the people, after he said no to the EU.440 
55 
Protecting 
Compatriots 
Arguments portraying Russia 
as a defender of compatriots 
abroad 
I would like to make it clear to all: our 
country will continue to actively defend 
the rights of Russians, our compatriots 
abroad, using the entire range 
of available means – from political 
19 
 
434 Frequency of codes 
435 Anonymous. Vladimir Putin’s interview with Radio Europe 1 and TF1 TV channel. op. cit. 
436 Remarks by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov during an open lecture on Russia’s current foreign policy, op. cit. 
437 Anonymous. Interv'ju Posla Rossii v Italii S.S.Razova dlja radioprogrammy “Corriere diplomatico” 
gosteleradio Italii “RAI Radio 1”, op. cit.  
438 Vystuplenie Posla Rossijskoj Federacii v Indonezii M.Ju.Galuzina v Universitete Indonezii na seminare «Krizis 
na Ukraine i ego vlijanie na Jugo-Vostochnuju Aziju», op. cit.  
439Anonymous. Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club. Official Internet Resources of the President 
of Russia, op. cit.  
440Anonymous. Interv'ju Posla Rossii v Shvecii V.I.Tatarinceva «Krym vsegda prinadlezhal Rossii», op. cit.  
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and economic to operations under 
international humanitarian law 
and the right of self-defence.441  
 
Crimea’s 
History 
Arguments constructing 
Crimea as a historical part of 
Russia 
The Crimea has been a part of Russia 
from 1783. In 1954, as per a personal 
initiative of Nikita Khrushchev, Head of 
the Soviet Union’s Communist Party, the 
Crimean Region was transferred from the 
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist 
Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet 
Federative Socialist Republic, along with 
Sevastopol, despite the fact that it was a 
federal city. It is still a matter of dispute 
for historians what stood behind this 
decision of his.442 
46 
Crimea after 
2014 
Arguments claiming that 
Crimea’s socioeconomic 
situation has improved after 
incorporation to Russia in 2014 
The Crimea and Sevastopol are well 
integrated into the single political, socio-
economic and legal area of the Russian 
Federation. The results of the presidential 
elections of 18 March 2018 demonstrated 
that the people of the Crimea are satisfied 
with development processes in the 
peninsula and soundly support the 
political course of federal authorities.443 
59 
 
  
 
441 Anonymous. Conference of Russian ambassadors and permanent representatives, op. cit.  
442 Anonymous. An Interview with Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of Russia in Nepal Mr. Yury Yuzhaninov on the 5th 
Anniversary of the Accession of the Crimea to the Russian Federation, op. cit.  
443 Ibid.  
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